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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MONETARY ECONOMICS
by
BERNARD GAUCI 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981
The application of the work of I. Lakatos to economics suggests 
that the neo-Walrasian monetary model is generated from a neoclassical 
microeconomic research program, as is the rational expectations hypo­
thesis. At the macroeconomic level, there are competing Keynesian and 
conservative programs. The latter contains monetarism as a constituent 
set of theories.
Methodological and policy-related debates reflect competition 
between these three programs. Despite the similarity between the policy 
recommendations of monetarism and the rational expectations hypothesis, 
their theoretical apparatus— dictated by the positive heuristic of 
their respective programs— are substantially different. Monetarism 
shares its macroeconomic equipment with Keynesianism, but the two dif­
fer in their policy recommendations.
A major characteristic of the neoclassical microeconomic program 
is the situational determinism found in its member theories. This in 
turn follows from the substantive (rather than procedural) rationality 
displayed by all economic agents in these theories. The same can be
ix
said of the rational expectations hypothesis. On the other hand, 
macroeconomic theories, whether Keynesian or monetarist, display a 
situational determinism only at the level of the policy-maker. The 
separation of economics from the other social sciences leads to a 
situational logic which enables the policy-maker in these models to 
reach decisions through the use of the substantive form of rationality.
x
INTRODUCTION
The literature has recently shown a proliferation of interest in 
the methodology of economics. Economics is commonly regarded as a 
leader among the social sciences in the rigor of its mathematical 
formulations and also because of the pioneering work in non-experimental 
corroboration by econometricians. As a result, economics has served as 
a fertile ground for the application of a variety of approaches in the 
philosophy of science.
A major recent development in the methodological literature has 
involved Imre Lakatos' concept of competing scientific research programs. 
This concept requires the condensation of an entire school of thought 
to a set of propositions incorporating the fundamental principles of the 
program together with a set of instructions for the construction of 
theories. The method used in the dissertation is to present these essen­
tial ingredients for one program and later return to ascertain whether 
a particular theory is compatible with these same ingredients. If not, 
a new program is suggested in which the theory is then placed as a con­
stituent member.
The concept of the research program is discussed and evaluated in 
the first chapter, as is the formulation of a neoclassical research 
program as suggested by S. J. Latsis. The letter's work is discussed 
further in Chapter 2, in the context of an application to neoclassical 
monetary theory. The dissertation goes on, in Chapter 3, to justify 
and then construct a separate Keynesian research program, which itself
1
2competes with the neoclassical microeconomic program. Whether mone­
tarism constitutes a separate program, or whether it belongs in some 
larger program, is one of the subjects discussed in Chapter 4, which 
deals with this question of identifying the important characteristics 
of monetarism, and studying its links with other schools of thought.
The conclusion is reached that within the macroeconomic arena, the 
Keynesian program competes with a conservative program. A separate 
section of Chapter 4 deals with the rational expectations hypothesis 
(REH), which is contrasted with monetarism, and, like monetarism, 
placed in the appropriate research program. The REH is described as 
appertaining to the neoclassical microeconomic program. This disserta­
tion therefore identifies two levels of program competition: between
microeconomic and macroeconomic programs and,among macroeconomic 
programs, between the Keynesian and conservative programs.
This is primarily an application of the Lakatosian method to 
Keynesian and monetarist theories as well as the REH, with emphasis 
throughout on monetary analysis. It finds particular benefit in con­
trasting the psychological assumptions underlying neoclassical, Keynes­
ian and monetarist theory and the REH. The relevance of this approach 




The process of building theoretical models in economics or else­
where is variously described as an "abstraction" from, or "idealiza­
tion" of reality. Theory can be defined as the symbolic (or, more 
loosely, the linguistic, mental or verbal) reproduction of what is per­
ceived. The ideal, but paradoxically the least useful, is the theory 
which constitutes a mirror image of what the perceiver attempts to 
portray. Limitations of the intellectual capabilities of the theorist 
stop the process well short of such a state of perfection. Indeed if 
intellectual powers were perfect, symbolic reproduction in the form of 
theoretical models would be unnecessary. Instead, the theorist has to 
make do with a less than perfect intellect and must apply his inadequate 
equipment to a complex subject matter. So he will limit himself to a 
portion of his surroundings.
At the risk of ignoring significant relationships, the economist, 
for example, will often exclude institutional or other social detail 
from his purview. This procedure, which one may label decomposition, 
after Simon,''- is manifested in the division of the social sciences into 
economics, sociology, anthropology, history and so on, with little sub­
stantial interaction among these fields. It is also evident within 
economics where, for example, the microtheorist ignores macroeconomic 
variables and vice versa, where the macrotheorist ignores microeconomic 
detail, or where the monetary theorist assumes a closed economy. Such
3
4a procedure may, in some instances, indicate a narrow-mindedness on the 
part of the theorist, but is otherwise excused by the inadequacy of the 
intellectual powers of the theorist. In other words, decomposition may 
be the only way to make a given problem tractable. But the cost of 
achieving this easy-way-out is the risk of inaccuracy, or erroneous 
decomposition. In some instances, the theorist may find himself in a 
situation where the only reproduction he can make is distorted.
Among the admitted variables, the theorist will emphasize some 
relationships and play down or ignore others. Once again, the motiva­
tion may be merely a need to make a symbolic reproduction possible.
For example, in Friedman’s interpretation of macroeconomic theory, the 
Keynesian school ignores the determination of the price level and 
assumes a fixed price level.^ (The quantity theorist adopts a similar 
procedure for the level of output, although here the level of output 
can be said to be determined by the separate, general-equilibrium 
model.) This process may be called specification, with the inherent 
danger, of course, being that of misspecification.
Sometimes, then, a distorted theory may be the only theory attain­
able. That a distorted representation of reality is better than no 
representation at all, or that one distorted presentation may be more 
useful, and therefore better than another appears to be similar to the 
position of such instrumentalists as Milton Friedman. What determines 
the validity of a theory is not the realism of its assumptions, but 
rather the accuracy of its predictions. Friedman explains:
A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that 
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the 
mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the 
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the
5basis of them. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must 
be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account 
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant cir-
custances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant
for the phenomena to be explained.3
This, in effect, is Friedman's justification for the techniques of
decomposition and specification.
Limitations on the intellectual power of the individual theorist 
also require most, if not all, theoretical activity to be carried out 
not by theorists in isolation, but by theorists as part of communities 
of intellectuals. If, for example, at the age of 35, somebody decides 
to start studying economics, it is unlikely that he would attempt to 
develop his own theory ah initio, but rather he would try to build upon
the work of his predecessors. In the light of our earlier discussion,
it is by the very definition of economics almost impossible to really 
start from scratch, since the very boundaries of economics were developed 
by several generations of decompositional activity and are unlikely to 
coincide with one's own decompositional tactics.
The idea of collegiality among scientists gained added recognition 
after T. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.1^ So-called 
normal science is carried out within a community which professes allegi­
ance to a so-called paradigm. The meaning of this last term is anything 
but clear, but can be defined for our pruposes as agreed and unquestion­
ed rules about decomposition and specification. These rules severely 
limit the range of questions addressed by the members of the paradigma­
tic community. The inability of the scientist to solve any of the 
puzzles permitted by the paradigm will reflect poorly not on the profes­
sion, but on the scientist. In other words, the science with its 
intrinsic methods of specification and decomposition is absolved from
6the problems and errors which these very methods may cause.
By Popper's criteria,-* science progresses through a chain of con­
jectures and refutationsw The advance of science is abetted by the 
construction of theories which lend themselves to refutation. Kuhn be­
lieves, however, that the Popperian overthrow of theories occurs only 
at intermittent stages. It never happens during periods of normal 
science. The inability of scientists to solve a puzzle here and a 
puzzle there does not shake the faith, but an accumulation of such 
anomalies may lead to a switch to a new paradigm. Such an event is 
called a revolution, where a new and incommensurable paradigm comes to 
rule the roost. The abruptness of the switch, hardly evident in the 
slow pace of change in the natural sciences, was toned down in the later 
Kuhn to allow for an interregnum of pretender-paradigms.^
The paradigm, then, is the hallmark of true science, distinguished 
by a unity of purpose and method in the profession. This is a statement 
of what science is, but there is a hint of how scientists should act, in 
that in a paradigmatic science research is streamlined in a fruitful 
direction. There is no duplication of research efforts, since para­
digmatic education enables scientists to communicate with ease. In con­
trast, during the preparadigmatic as well as the revolutionary period, 
there is a plethora of research lines, all independent and lacking 
channels of intercommunication. Paradigmatic science can therefore be 
called efficient. On the other hand, it could be said to constitute a 
dictator's paradise. If the dictator executes all the dissidents, those 
who survive will be scientists in the true Kuhnian sense of the word.
In other words, while descriptively the Kuhnian model might perform ade­
quately, ominous results might follow if a college dean were to regard
7it as a source of prescriptive (or normative) inspiration.^
Yet even insofar as mere description is concerned, problems arise 
in application to economics. First of all, there is the question of 
the geographical scope of the paradigm. For example, in some of the 
natural sciences there might be one universal paradigm, but hardly in 
economics, where the Soviet paradigm, for example, is entirely differ­
ent from the American paradigm. It appears, then, that the paradigm in 
economics may be less than universal. Clearly, the majority of American 
and British economists, with significant number of continental Europeans, 
think alike, as it were, in a number of important ways. While the para­
digm cannot claim the membership of all the economists on earth, the 
presence of Marxists, radicals and so on in the United States does not 
imply that the concept of the paradigm cannot be applied at all. These 
minorities are well aware of the overwhelming predominance and power of 
the majority, are conversant with the opinions of the majority, and a 
significant portion of their academic activity consists precisely of 
defending their position against the majority opinion.
Then what constitutes the present-day paradigm in western economics? 
We might start by trying to identify all that is common to the majority. 
Superficially, we can identify a body of knowledge learned by every 
successful undergraduate, consisting of neoclassical price theory, 
particularly the perfectly competitive model, and macroeconomic theory, 
including primarily basic Keynesian theory. Around the basic, perfectly 
competitive model are derived rules for social optimization, and models 
of imperfect competition. Around the macroeconomic core are built 
frameworks for the formulation and implementation of fiscal and monetary 
policy. The various parts may be contradictory at times, but a certain
8unity emerges in the flavor of policy recommendations. Dominant 
political thought among economists holds to the underlying desirability 
of allowing market forces to dominate the economy, with all the benefits 
of such a policy as suggested by microeconomic welfare theory. That is 
as much as can be said to be true of the beliefs of the mainstream. A 
monetarist is likely to hold the view with a very strong conviction; a 
Keynesian would probably be more willing to propose state intervention. 
Yet to both, operation of free or relatively free markets in significant 
sections of the economy is acceptable and to both positions (as well as 
to intermediate positions), paradigmatic economics provides the neces­
sary theoretical background. Both parties can undergo a common intel- 
«
lectual training, and have a common language in which to debate their 
paradigmatically-constrained differences. This language includes 
definitions of a wide range of theoretical terms and econometric techni­
ques. In addition, the professionality of the science precludes, to a 
considerable extent, the development and diffusion of non-paradigmatic 
economics. On the other hand, the further elaboration and testing of 
intra-paradigmatic issues is encouraged and professionally stimulated.
This method of identifying the paradigm is based on a particular 
view of economics. Rather than regard theoretical method and empirical 
investigation as logically, if not chronologically, preceding policy 
recommendations, I view method in economic theory, as well as econometric 
method, as following from the school of thought which is itself defined 
by the social, political or ideological flavor of its policy recommenda­
tions. Kuhn’s ideas cast doubt on the claim of some econometricians to 
be the ultimate arbiters in the development of economic theories. As 
long as theorists and econometricians are inhibited by the paradigm,
g
the process of corroboration is not totally unconstrained.
Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program (SRP)
But what has been gained by viewing all of economics as being 
encompassed by one paradigm? Clearly, by our approach, a variety of 
policy recommendations may well require a corresponding variety of 
theories. Instead of lumping the Keynesians and the monetarists 
together, it might be more useful to recognize that the two schools com 
pete with one another, even though there is some overlap between them. 
The only way two schools can coexist in the Kuhnian framework is if the 
science lies in a nonnormal state.
9
These kinds of issues are addressed by Lakatos. Instead of the 
monolithic Kuhnian paradigm, Lakatos envisages competing research 
programs, each of which may contain any number of theories. For a 
theory to belong to a particular program, it must be built upon a set 
of propositions which constitute the hard core of the program. Unlike 
the rather vague concept of the "unwritten, but always-observed rules" 
of the Kuhnian paradigm, the negative heuristic of the SRP instructs 
the theorist to uphold the specific propositions of the hard core.
These propositions can be identified as the decompositional and specifi 
cational instructions mentioned earlier in this chapter.
Over time, all the theories appertaining to a program will retain 
all the propositions of the hard core, but any additional propositions 
will vary from theory to theory. These extra propositions form the 
protective belt of the program. Another essential ingredient of a pro­
gram is the positive heuristic which gives the theoretician his method­
ological instructions. Allegiance to the positive heuristic of the
10
program, together with the negative heuristic itself, seem to make up 
the Lakatosian equivalent of the Kuhnian paradigm.
The program will progress if the modifications incorporated in the 
protective belt lead to new testable hypotheses and then if this addi­
tional content is corroborated. Whenever a theory is not corroborated, 
scientists are likely to resort to changes in the protective belt and 
modifications which fail the empirical test will indicate to the method­
ologist that the program is degenerating.
One benefit of the Lakatosian over the Kuhnian method is that the 
SRP approach calls for the condensation of a school of thought to a set 
or sets of propositions. This has the advantage of requiring the 
theorist to describe theories very rigorously and accurately. Yet the 
only such application of the Lakatosian methodology to economics was 
made by L a t s i s , w h o  developed a schema for the neoclassical research 
program. In the eyes of Latsis, the fundamental aspect of neoclassical 
theory is its situational determinism, a subject which broaches the 
psychological dimension of economic theory.
Economic Psychology
Neoclassical economics is often criticized for overemphasizing the 
individual economic agent at the expense of his context— the society 
around him. This is the starting point of a number of critiques of the 
neoclassical method. The general equilibrium system is seen to con­
sist of many utility-maximizing individuals reposing in a universal 
general equilibrium, in a system which completely ignores the social 
environment, the institutional framework and historical background.
Now the accusation of individualism is superficially similar to the
11
accusation that neoclassical theory is overly psychological. In other 
words, if economic theory is so intent on analyzing the individual as 
to ignore the environmental noise, then it is bound to emphasize the 
individual's cognitive processes, hence laying itself upon the accusa­
tion of being too psychological. It may come as a surprise, therefore, 
that some writers in this area have found the psychological content of 
neoclassical theory to be quite trivial. The level of psychological 
intricacy in the typical neoclassical problem has been compared to the 
following:
Predict the behavior of a driver whose automobile is traveling 
on a dry road at a speed of 60 m.p.h. at a distance of 10 feet 
behind another car, when the latter stops abruptly.
One safe prediction would be that the driver will slam on his brakes 
as hard and as quickly as he can. One could devise very elaborate 
psychological explanations of this prediction, but the prediction it­
self is not only safe but is also neutral with respect to the various 
psychological theories which could be brought to bear upon the problem. 
More formally, we can classify the problem as one in which the logic of 
the situation tolerates a unique solution, making a psychological study 
of the matter redundant. If the prediction failed to acquire corrobora­
tion, the predictor is likely to protest that significant data, such as 
suicidal tendencies on the part of the driver, have been held back.
Latsis finds the same to be true in the neoclassical research 
program in economics. Take for example the perfectly competitive model, 
where the seller is faced with a horizontal demand tangent to the long- 
run average cost curve at its lowest point. In this situation, the 
seller has no choice but to produce the quantity corresponding to the 
tangency. It is not just a matter of optimization; it is really a
12
question of survival. The market pushes the price level to a tangency 
with the average cost curve and the firm will go out of business unless 
its production takes place at the quantity corresponding to the 
tangency. Like the driver in the previous paragraph, the perfect com­
petitor really has no choice. Latsis argues that in economics, prob­
lems are set up in such a way that the situation has only a single exit. 
Latsis emphasizes the link between the character of such solutions to 
the quality of psychological or socio-psychological content; yet one 
could equally emphasize the lack of a sociological or political content, 
which like the absence of a non-trivial psychological dimension, leads 
to the situational determinism.
To elaborate on the psychological aspects of this theme, I shall 
introduce Simon’s distinction between substantive and procedural 
rationality,"^ a distinction which shall be needed again in our dis­
cussion of the rational expectations hypothesis in Chapter 4. Substan­
tive rationality "depends upon the actor in only one respect— his goals. 
Given these goals, rational behavior is determined entirely by the 
characteristics of the environment in which it takes place." In the 
example of the driver, above, or the firm in the perfectly competitive 
model, the problem is set up in such a way that, given a goal— survival—  
the behavior of the actor is readily predictable, since the logic of the 
situation tolerates only one outcome. Rationality enters only in the 
determination of the goals, but has nothing to do with the procedure of 
achieving the goal. The situational assumptions determine uniquely the 
course of action which will lead the agent to that goal. Psychologists, 
however, usually have something different in mind when they deal with 
rationality, namely the procedural form of rationality. On procedural
13
rationality, Simon writes:
The process of rational calculation is only interesting when 
it is non-trivial— that is, when the substantively rational 
response to a situation is not instantly obvious. If you put 
a quarter and a dime before a subject and tell him that he
may have either one, but not both, it is easy to predict
which he will choose, but not easy to learn anything about
his cognitive processes. Hence procedural rationality is 
usually studied in problem situations— situations in which 
the subject must gather information of various kinds and 
process it in different ways in order to arrive at a reason­
able course of action, a solution to the problem.12
Hence, "behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of 
appropriate deliberation.11 When a trade union is about to negotiate a 
wage contract, it faces the task of devising a procedure for figuring 
out what the rate of inflation is likely to be over the duration of the 
contract. Such problems in procedural rationality are much harder to 
handle than those dealing with substantive rationality, where, for ex­
ample, the theorist assumes that the rate of inflation expected by the
trade union is the same as that predicted by the model. More on this
particular example in Chapter 4.
The distinction between the two forms of rationality is perhaps 
clarified by this quotation from Simon's explanation of an experiment 
by Feldman^
Suppose that you present a subject with a random sequence of 
X's and 0/s, of which 70% are X5 s and 30% O's. You ask the 
subject to predict the next symbol, rewarding him for the 
number of correct predictions. "Obviously" the rational 
behavior is always to predict X. This is what subjects 
almost never do. Instead, they act as though the sequence 
were patterned, not random, and guess by trying to extra­
polate the pattern. This kind of guessing will lead X to 
be guessed in proportion to the frequency with which it 
occurs in the sequence. As a result, the sequence of guesses 
has about the same statistical properties as the original 
sequence, but the prediction accuracy is lower than if X had 
been predicted each time (58% instead of 70%) .
In this case the study (typical of microeconomics) of what the subjects
14
rarely if ever do assumes substantive rationality, while an analysis of 
how the subjects attempt to outguess the pattern of X ’s and 0/s is a 
study in procedural rationality.
Simon’s distinction between the various forms of rationality is 
not the first in the social sciences. Earlier, Weber distinguished be­
tween formal and substantive rationality. The extent of quantitative 
calculation, and the degree to which such calculation is then acted upon 
in the pursuit of, say, profit maximization, reflects the formal ration­
ality of economic action. Monetization of the economy is necessary for 
formal rationality, which becomes manifested in accounting and budgetary 
management techniques. In contrast, substantive rationality is mani­
fested in the "extent to which it is possible to secure what, according 
to a given system of values, is an adequate provision of a population 
with goods and services, and in the process remain in accord with the 
ethical requirements of the system of n o r m s . I n  Weber's words, "it 
is not sufficient to consider only the purely formal fact that calcula­
tions are being made on grounds of expediency by the methods which are, 
among those available, technically the most nearly adequate. In addi­
tion, it is necessary to take account of the fact that economic activity 
is oriented to ultimate ends of some kind, whether they be ethical, 
political, utilitarian. . . . Weber's distinction between forms of
rationality manifested by the economy leads to the study of the poten­
tial for conflict between them. Unlike Weber's, Simon's distinction is 
between forms of rationality manifested at the same level of the 
economy (primarily microeconomic), and there is no hint of any hierarchy 
of types of rationality. The conflict in Simon's case is mostly in the 
mind of the methodologist and the theorist: should the latter set up
sr
15
i ■ the model in a manner which endows impulsive action with its own form
of rationality (since impulsive action will generate the right result, 
if constrained by the proper kind of situational logic), or should the 
theorist abstain from modeling this substantive form of rationality, 
and deal instead with problems where impulsive action becomes procedur- 
ally irrational?
Latsis1 SRP
In the neoclassical model, the economy is sterilized not only of 
all extra-economic, social detail but also of most psychological 
intricacy. The absence of these qualities is borne out in Latsis’ sug­
gested neoclassical research program. Latsis, in his formulation of a 
neoclassical SRP (page 9), suggests the following propositions as com-
1 f i
prising the hard core :
(i) Decision-makers have correct knowledge of the relevant 
features of their economic situation.
(ii) Decision-makers prefer the best available alternative 
given their knowledge of the situation and of the 
means at their disposal.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), situations generate their internal 
’logic' and decision-makers act appropriately to the 
logic of their situation.
(iv) Economic units and structures display stable, coordi­
nated behavior.
His version of the positive heuristic is as follows:
(a) Construct static models.
(b) Minimize and if possible completely eliminate psycho­
logical and, in general, non-economic content from the 
model.
(c) Set up the situational assumptions in such a way that 
a determinate equilibrium issues. (Set up "Single­
exit" situational models.)
(d) Where possible construct functions which are suitable 
for the application of the procedures of the calculus.
(e) If the model yields no determinate equilibrium, modify 
the situational assumptions until such a solution 
becomes possible.
(f) When the model yields a determinate equilibrium, attempt 
' to refine it by introducing more realistic situational
assumptions.
16
The situational determinism of neoclassical theory is particularly evi­
dent in hard core proposition (iii) and positive heuristic instructions
(b) and (c). For example, as applied to indifference curve analysis in 
consumer theory, hard core postulate (ii) translates into the assump­
tion of utility maximization, while instruction (c) calls for the addi­
tion of such assumptions as non-satiation, convexity, and transitivity 
of preferences— in effect ensuring a unique solution (a "single exit") 
to the utility maximization problem.
One problem inherent in the Lakatosian methodology, is the sweep 
of the propositions in the hard-core. For example, it is conceivable 
that a weak version of Keynesian theory would qualify in the neoclassi­
cal program, if the latter*s hard-core is watered down sufficiently.
In the practical application of Lakatos1 ideas, the scope of a program 
depends crucially on the inclusiveness of the hard-core, which could in 
turn be influenced by the vantage-point of the methodologist. For ex­
ample, it could conceivably be argued (though Chapter 4 below reaches 
a very different conclusion) that monetarism is part of a wider neo­
classical research program, which would itself compete with a Keynesian 
program. This extended neoclassical program would encompass a range of 
theories which generally make policy recommendations whose political 
flavor is usually labelled as conservative. However, this revised, 
neoclassical hard-core, besides being different from that of Latsis, 
would then also be different from what a methodologist would have con­
structed, say, 30 years ago, before the emergence of monetarism.
A case will be made in Chapter 3 for a separate, competing Keynes­
ian program, as opposed to a mere Keynesian theory within the larger
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neoclassical program— the justification being that Keynesian policy 
recommendations often vary widely from those of a neoclassicist. The 
positive heuristic of the Keynesian program directs the theorist to 
construct macroeconomic models, and as shall be argued in Chapter 3, 
this has a lot to do with the types of policy recommendations which 
emerge. This suggests the proposition (d) in Latsis’ neoclassical 
positive heuristic above ought perhaps to be reworded to specify the 
microeconomic character of the static models. As it stands, the term 
"decision-makers" in the hard-core could possibly refer to macroeconom­
ic policy makers, and this possibility must be excluded.
While an improvement over Kuhn's in that it allows for the coex­
istence of rival, powerful programs, Lakatos' framework shares with 
Kuhn's a suggesv;ion of the social setting of science. The influence of 
the intellectual environment on the individual scientist is manifested, 
in particular, in Lakatos' negative heuristic. This context-dependency 
of economic thought is further explored in the next section.
The Role of Econometrics
Some methodologists believe that change in economic theory is the 
result of hard thinking by academicians and ruthless testing by econo­
metricians. In contrast to this objectivist attitude, relativists view 
the social environment of economists as the major determinant of econom­
ic thought. ^  The true picture probably lies somewhere between the two 
positions. For one thing, crucial testing often comes from, and there­
fore varies with contemporary events and developments in society and in 
these situations there is an element of truth in both points of view.
For example, the early Keynesian models, which ignored the price level
18
and the rate of inflation, were widely acceptable in the inflation-free 
50's, but were less and less satisfactory as inflation accelerated in 
later decades. The objectivist would hold that Keynesian theory failed 
to explain the course of price movements and was therefore refuted.
The relativist would counter that such a refutation, aside from its 
correctness or otherwise, is itself a function of the times and their 
problems: were not inflation such a problem in the '70's, this refuta­
tion would never have come about and Keynesianism would now be more 
widely adhered to. There seems to be a social process of evidence- 
selection, where only certain aspects of the total evidence are investi­
gated. (To take another example, unemployment constituted a social and 
economic problem well before Keynesian times, but it was not fully 
recognized as such.-'-®) What is being suggested is that in the same 
manner as the theorist selects out certain variables and certain rela­
tionships for his detailed study, so also the econometrician is likely 
to analyze not the entire span of human of history, but merely a short 
part thereof. To come back to the question of inflation in Keynesian 
theory, one should mention that some objectivists may appropriately add 
that the inflation of the '70's is itself the result of the earlier, 
misguided policies suggested by Keynesian theory, and that these recom­
mendations simply failed the test of the '70's.
Here lies another crucial characteristic of the social sciences.
The experiment of the natural scientist usually leaves the subject 
matter unchanged, but the theorizing of social scientists, especially 
when buttressed by the evidence, may lead to policy changes, which in 
turn— through their effect on economic or other variables— will influ­
ence the nature of the evidence as received by future social scientists.
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Clearly, econometricians who respect their own profession would 
adhere to the objectivist position, which is in turn part of the wider 
positivist view. For a positivist, econometrics play an important role 
in the search for regularities in the data, and in projecting these 
regularities into the future. Degeneration or progression of the SRP
depends crucially, by this view, on the econometric results. (Others,
/
however, are dubious of the ability of econometrics to discriminate 
between good and bad theories and they point to the endless debates in 
the literature.)
The positivist approach seeks to expand the predictive capabili­
ties of economics: true science enables us to predict future experi-
1 Qence, and so control our environment. 3 The positivist procedure is to 
set up models whose predictions are then tested. The "problem of 
induction" recognizes that it is impossible for a test or any number of 
tests to verify a universal statement, or even of negating it. Just 
because the sun has so far risen every morning, it does not follow that 
the universal statement, "the sun rises every morning" or "the earth 
turns every day," is true. Also, the negation of a universal statement 
by some crucial experiment can be circumscribed quite easily. For ex­
ample, the typical test involves not one hypothesis in isolation, but 
rather a whole set of hypotheses. If the results are negative, the 
whole set is refuted, but this does not necessarily mean that each 
hypothesis is false. So, if I test the statement, "Quantity demanded 
depends upon the price, all other things being equal," and the test 
proves negative, I can, if I so choose, maintain that quantity demanded 
does indeed depend upon the price, but that during the test, one or 
more of the "other things" changed. The crucial experiment, the one
20
which makes or breaks the theory, so to speak, is very rare and so the 
tester can usually only collect evidence for, or against a hypothesis, 
in other words, resort to probabilistic corroboration. "To say that an 
observation increases the probability of a hypothesis . . .  is equiva­
lent to saying that the observation increases the degree of confidence
20 21with which it is rational to entertain the hypothesis." ’
This approach, with all its limitations, is common to all the 
sciences, whether natural or social. The best that can be achieved in 
any science is not absolute verification, but merely probabilistic cor­
roboration: the econometrician, for example, never seeks to prove a
hypothesis, but merely to gather further supporting observations, 
enhancing the probability that a hypothesis is correct. It. is in the 
very nature of this method that the interpretation of the statistical 
results is somewhat subjective, partly because no test is powerful 
enough to yield clear and overriding results. To take the simplest of 
examples, a comparison of the correlation coefficients for two separate, 
single equation models (with the same dependent variable) is valid only 
when they have a common number of independent variables. Even if this 
condition is met, other test statistics (such as the t-statistics cor­
responding to the parameter estimates) need to be consulted, and there 
is no assurance that different statistics will yield converging results. 
The problems of interpretation become more intricate as the number of 
equations increases.
These difficulties are compounded by the peculiarities of the social 
sciences. Some economists scoff at the differences between the natural 
and the social sciences and point out that astronomers too cannot con­
duct experiments with the planets and the stars, and that therefore
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there is nothing intrinsically different between the non-laboratory 
method of economics and the method of the natural sciences. This 
observation depends crucially on the interpretation of the word 
"intrinsically." Natural scientists generally conduct their experi­
ments under conditions which allow them to maintain total control over 
which variables participate— human genetics and astronomy being major 
exceptions. The typical problems of econometrics— omission of a rele­
vant variable from an equation, the inclusion of an irrelevant variable, 
serial correlation, simultaneity bias, heteroscedacticity, and all the 
complications manifested in the behavior of the error term— are of 
little concern to the natural sciences, where the experimental method
and the process of Fisherian randomization ensure that the error term 
22is harmless.
The problems discussed in econometric theory deal with instances 
where the assumptions underlying the classical linear regression model 
(CLR) are not satisfied. With all the assumptions met, the ordinary 
least squares method would yield parameter estimates from which infor­
mation about population parameters can readily be inferred. If, for 
example, the relationship between the variables under study is not 
linear, a crucial CLR assumption is breached. The problem of non- 
linearity is obviously not unique to econometrics or any other non- 
experimental science. (Of course, in the non-experimental sciences 
there is a greater likelihood— because of the difficulties inherent in 
the testing procedures— that the scientist will be compelled to extra­
polate his results, valid as they may be for small ranges where linear­
ity is a reasonable approximation, to a longer span where non-lineari­
ties come into play.) But the majority of the problems are due entirely
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to the non-experimental nature of econometrics. Take the problem of 
multicollinearity— the breach of the CLR condition that no pair of inde­
pendent variables be linearly related. If the economist could construct 
his own experiments and rigidly control the variables, the problem of 
multicollinearity would more easily be controlled. As important are the 
problems relating to the error term— the non-zero mean of the distur­
bance term, heteroscedacticity (or non-constant variance of the error 
term), autocorrelated error term and so on. It is only when research is 
carried on outside the laboratory that the error term becomes very 
troublesome and such problems assume significant proportions.
Another problem which has nothing to do with the breach of any 
CLR assumptions, but still reflects the difficulties of the. non-experi­
mental method is that of deriving parameter estimates for the original 
equations in a simultaneous system after the reduced forms are put to 
the test, namely the problem of identification. Complete control over 
the variables, as in the experimental sciences, excludes the overlap
between endogenous and independent variables: in an experimental test,
23independent variables are more strictly controlled by the scientist.
The presumption that the methods of the natural sciences carry over 
well to the social sciences can perhaps be challenged from a different 
angle, which has to do with the multi-level nature of causality in 
social systems. Suppose one were to attempt a mathematical representa­
tion of a situation where the rate of inflation is perceived as being 
positively related to trade union pressure on wages, accommodated by an 
expansive monetary policy. The permissiveness of monetary policy is a 
condition necessary in the model for trade union pressure to be trans­
mitted into higher prices. A regression one could test in an attempt
23
at empirical corroboration would be:
P = aQ + a1 T + a2 M,
where T is a proxy for trade union strength, M stands for monetary
growth, P for the rate of inflation. Then a^ is equal to the partial
derivative, 3 P, which measures the influence of T on P, with an un- 
3 T
changing M, Now suppose the model accurately represents reality, that 
is that trade unions do indeed cause inflation, but only if the mone­
tary authorities allow them to. In that case, the partial derivative 
of P with respect to T will equal zero: without a monetary change, 
trade union cannot influence the rate of inflation. But such a result 
in no way justifies the statement that "trade union power has no effect 
on inflation." On the contrary, trade unions serve as a conduit for 
monetary pressures on the rate of inflation. The trouble is the con­
tribution of trade unions is different from that of the monetary 
authorities: the two influences do not operate at the same level. We
have a hierarchy of influences, while econometrics appears to capture 
a relationship at only one level of the hierarchy.^
The intrinsic limitations of econometric tools reinforces the 
importance of the a_ priori. A pertinent episode is recounted by H.O. 
Wold,25 who notes that in the experimental sciences, the estimation of 
a^ and b^ in
y - aL + bxz
and the estimation of a„ and b in
2 2




The problem of the "choice or regression" does not arise in the experi­
mental sciences, since the researcher can easily keep track of which 
one was the independent variable, and can therefore compute the para­
meter estimates accordingly. With the non-experimental method, however, 
the two regression relationships become
E(yjz) = a ’^  + b * ^ z
and
E(z|y) = a'2 + b' y 
The presence of an error term in the computation implies that
a 'l
b' ) S J L  and a' )i -
2 b ’x 2 b'x
In 1906, P. Mackeprang attempted to estimate the price elasticity of 
coffee and could not make up his mind between the two alternative esti­
mates, 0.42 and 0.83, and presented the problem as involving a "choice 
of regression." Nowadays, most economists would choose the first esti­
mate, obtained by regressing quantity on price. That such a choice 
would be made regardless of what the summary statistics indicate re­
flects the importance of the a_ priori and the weakness of econometric 
tools.
A combination of some of the problems alluded to above appears to 
be at work in the ongoing debate about the St. Louis equations. The
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original tests published in 1968 by Andersen and Jordan^ assessed the
relative strength of monetary and fiscal policy (the former as measured
by the narrowly defined money stock, the latter by high employment
federal expenditures) and found the former to be more effective. A
9  7reply in 1969, by De Leeuw and Kalchbrenner, disputed these findings
on the grounds that the independent variables were not truly exogenous,
a condition necessary for the absence of correlation between the inde-
2 8pendent variables and the error term. Benjamin Friedman retested the
equations with data through 1976 and found fiscal policy to be more
effective: the St. Louis equation now believed in fiscal policy.
Carlson^ rejected Friedman's results: he found that: heteroscedacticity
plagued the Friedman data, but not the original Andersen-Jordan data.
To guarantee homoscedacticity Carlson reestimated the Friedman equation:
whereas Friedman (like Andersen-Jordan) used the first differences of
10all the variables, Carlson substituted rates-of-change. Vrooman com­
plained that this switch in specification destroys the comparability of 
the results with the original Andersen-Jordan, and also suggested that 
the observed heteroscedacticity reflects more than a statistical prob­
lem: the St. Louis equation might have been suffering from misspecifi-
cation all along. Difficulty in resolving these issues seems to stem 
primarily from the non-experimental nature of econometrics manifested 
in a troublesome error term, and possibly also from the failure of 
single-level equation systems to handle structural shifts through time.
In closing, mention ought to be made of another possible source of 
weakness in econometric testing: the quality of the statistical data.
It could be argued that the collection of data is itself subject to 
theoretical considerations. It is itself paradigmatic, or (in
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Lakatosian terms) it belongs within a scientific research program and 
is therefore performed according to the rules of some positive heuris­
tic. If this program is a larger one which also includes economic 
theory, there might be an automatic bias testing of such theory as well 
as theories in competing programs. This application of Lakatos' SRP to 
statistical data collection is not discussed in the literature, but 
there are many indications that it could be a fruitful line of research.
A sampling of areas of potential problems would include: Von Mises^l
categorically states that the insolubility of the index number problem 
implies the nonsensical nature of- the concept of the absolute price 
level; present-day adherents to the Austrian school accordingly reject 
the social accounting systems of m a c r o e c o n o m i c s . ^2 Baumgartner and 
DeVille^ raise serious questions about the disparity in the treatment 
in national income accounting between labor and capital. Harris-^ 
questions the usefulness of published macroeconomic data to Marxist 
analysis. Though it does not necessarily follow that this issue is 
relevant to the statistical analysis of the monetarist-Keynesian debate, 
it is deserving of further consideration.
Conclusion
Empirical testing is surely a healthy exercise which stimulates 
and enhances the development of economic theory. Yet it does have some 
limitations. And it is these limitations which lead to the predicament 
of some major economic debates. Wilber traces the development of the 
controversy surrounding the Friedman-Meiselman findings, in a manner 
similar to the discussion of the St. Louis equation above. He adds,
"when the theory becomes so immune to refutation, it functions more as 
a prescriptive than a descriptive device. This is the way the Keynesian-
27
monetarist controversy should be seen."-^ According to the positivist 
methodology, of course, prescriptions, or normative statements, do not 
belong in scientific practice. With these thoughts in mind, the follow­
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which is a radically different version of the model: it suggests
that fiscal policy affects income directly as well as indirectly, 
through monetary changes (the roles of monetary and fiscal policy 
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y = S q +  a^z + a2x
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and therefore y = 3q + bQZ + bjxz + a2 X (2)
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CHAPTER 2
A NEOCLASSICAL MONETARY MODEL
The previous chapter introducted Lakatos' scientific research pro­
gram (SRP), and its application to economics by Latsis. The latter 
dealt mainly with the theory of the firm in various market structures—  
theories which form part of the larger neoclassical SRP. Other areas of 
neoclassical theory which could be presented in a similar format would 
include consumer and growth theory, as well as monetary theory. In each, 
the distinguishing criterion— the characteristic which separates them 
from theories belonging to competing programs— is the microeconomic 
situational determinism (page 10) built into the models. This determin­
ism in turn is predicated on the presumption of the substantive form of 
rationality. This is particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
dissertation because this determinism is shared by the rational expecta­
tions hypothesis, a subject of discussion in Chapter 4.
This chapter looks at neoclassical, microeconomic, monetary theory 
in some detail, in preparation for the discussion of Keynesian and mone­
tarist theory in later chapters. It will suggest a qualification to the 
assertion that neoclassical monetary theory is situationally determinate 
in all its aspects.
The Neoclassical Dichotomy
The term "transmission mechanism" refers to the manner in which 
monetary changes, originating in policy or otherwise, affect economic
33
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variables. The centerpiece of neoclassical monetary theory is the so- 
called neutral nature of money. Neutrality means that any effect of 
monetary changes on variables other than the absolute price level is 
temporary, to be reversed in a long run where all quantities and rela­
tive prices return to their starting position. This chapter will address 
itself to those transmission channels whose influence is restricted to 
the absolute price level.
Despite the agreement among such neoclassical models on long-run 
neutrality, there has been substantial controversy as to the nature and 
specific formulation of a model which, while satisfying all the neo­
classical criteria, will not, at the same time, suffer from logical flaws.
Logical elegance and consistency are among the hallmarks of.the neo- 
2
classical method; hence, the search for logical contradictions in any 
model which claims to be neoclassical.
All neoclassical models separate the determination of real variables 
from that of nominal values. In some simplified models this is achieved 
by having a set of equations determine the real variables, namely the 
level of output and relative prices. One additional equation introduces 
the money supply and sets the absolute price level. The "real" set is 
self-contained and has as many equations as unknown variables. The 
dichotomy of monetary from value theory is complete.3 Consider one such 
macroeconomic model:
s = i (1)
s = s(r) (2)
i = i(r) (3)
q = q(L) (4)
L = L(W/P) (5)
W/P = qL(L) (6)
In this model, six equations determine six unknowns: q (output) and its
two components, s (saving) and i (investment); two relative prices, r
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(the interest rate) and W/P (the real wage); and L (the labor force).
The addition of a further equation— the quantity equation—
M = q PK (7)
determines a further unknown, P (the absolute price level); M is the 
money stock and K is a constant.
This model, although aggregative, has traditional, neoclassical- 
leanings. Although it borrows from the Keynesian method in the use of 
such aggregate concepts as saving and investment, several features dis­
tinguish it from the typical Keynesian models. For example, the labor 
market (equations (5) and (6)) take the economy to full employment, and 
this level of employment is then related to the full-employment level of 
output (equation (4)). The equality of aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply therefore occurs automatically at full employment.
A closer look reveals a possible problem in the model. We first 
introduce Walras’ and Say’s Laws. The former states that any system of 
markets taken as a whole will have a net excess demand equivalent to 
zero. Excess demand in one or more markets must necessarily have a 
counterpart excess supply in one or more other markets, for a net excess 
demand of zero. The logic behind this is that the offer, or supply, of 
goods on a market is only one facet of a market transaction or an attempt 
at a market transaction; other goods, or more likely money, are expected 
and demanded in return. The implication is that Walras’ Law is an iden­
tity and will hold at all times, both in and out of equilibrium.
But is the same true of the markets for commodities taken on their 
own, in other words the markets for all goods and services except money? 
9?y's Law answers this question in the positive: there can be no net
excess demand in all commodity markets taken together. Let us consider
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the identity version of Say’s Law and examine the only two possible 
eventualities: Say’s Identity is either true or untrue.
Suppose first that Say’s Identity is true, and let us analyze the 
consequences for a monetized economy. This identity implies that excess 
demand for the real sector as a whole is identically (that is, irrespec­
tive of whether the real sector is in equilibrium or not) equal to zero. 
Invoking Walras’ Law, we can adduce that there can be no excess demand, 
or disequilibrium, in the money market. Money supply and money demand 
are identically equal. If the equality in (7) above were replaced by 
an identity sign (=), P would be rigidly defined as M/qK, whereas an 
equation would have told us about the behavior of P when in equilibrium, 
and would have then set us on the separate task of finding P’s behavior 
out of equilibrium. A definition cannot indicate any causality. As a 
result, P could change and since q is exogenous for the purposes of the 
equation, M would simultaneously follow suit and change by the same pro­
portion. In that sense, P is indeterminate. This unsatisfactory state 
of affairs can be corrected by reneging on Say’s Identity.
Therefore suppose that Say's Identity is not true. Then, a situa­
tion might occur where the real sector is in disequilibrium and, in view 
of the dichotomy (the complete separation of money from real markets), 
the money market will search independently for its own equilibrium. In 
this situation, it is entirely possible that the commodity markets be 
in disequilibrium while the money market reaches a state of equilibrium. 
The dichotomy removes all assurance that Walras' Law— that the sum of 
excess demands in all markets be equal to zero— would hold. The discon­
nection of the monetary sector from the rest of the economy removes the 
mechanism which would have insured the validity of Walras' Law. This
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is an equally undesirable situation.
The only way out of this bind is to breach the dichotomy, and 
include money in the real sector. This can be achieved by including 
money inside the utility functions. (These functions would be included 
in the general equilibrium model which underlies the aggregative model.) 
Then we would reject Say’s Identity, and include money in the real 
sector. The interrelationship between the money and the commodity mar­
kets would ensure that, when the commodity market is in disequilibrium, 
so is the money market. Net excess demand in either one will be accom­
panied by net excess supply in the other, for a total, economy-wide net 
excess demand of zero, thus ensuring compliance with Walras’ Law.
We can refer to the absolute price level as the relative price of 
nominal money. In an aggregative model, with one composite commodity,^ 
the relative price of nominal money stands for the amount of the compo­
site commodity that will exchange for one unit of nominal money. (In a 
more decomposed, microeconomic model, the absolute price level is re­
placed by the set of relative prices of nominal money for each of the 
various commodities.) An increase in the supply of nominal money can be 
expected to have repercussions on this relative price. There can be no 
monetary effect on the rest of the economy (i.e., there can be no mone­
tary transmission mechanism) unless the model integrates the monetary 
and commodity sectors. A dichotomy of the two would make the demand for 
commodities functionally independent of the holdings of money; this 
would leave the rate of exchange of money for commodities totally inde­
terminate. Foregoing the dichotomy permits monetary changes to affect 
the markets for commodities; it is only by virtue of this effect that 
monetary changes can influence the absolute price level.
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The real balance effect, made possible by the inclusion of M inside 
the utility function, constitutes the transmission channel in neoclassi­
cal theory.
The Real Balance Effect^
Inclusion of money in the utility function implies that the utility 
maximizer will allocate his resources between additions to his money 
stock and the purchase of commodities. The utility maximizer will begin 
the exchange period with initial endowments of commodities and money.
In figure 1, real balances are represented on the vertical axis, real in­
come on the horizontal axis. If real income or output at the beginning 
of the period were OA and real balances AF, the budget line would be CD, 
which has a slope of 135°. Although the budget line reaches point C on 
the horizontal axis, real output cannot exceed OA, which represents in­
come at full employment. An individual can always exchange output for 
real balances, but the representative individual cannot obtain output 
in excess of OA.
Take initial point F, the intersection of AZ (the perpendicular at 
real income A) with the budget line CD. Let F be off the expansion path 
OE. In such an event, the utility maximizer will reduce his real bal­
ances by FH— the vertical distance between F and R— in order to consume 
OG in commodities. As a result, real balances will shrink to AH by the 
start of the "next" period, and when the "next" period comes around the 
utility maximizer will move along his new budget line to J, which lies 
on the expansion path. Again, real balances decline to AK by the next 
period. This process goes on until M is reached. Here the utility 
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lines. Hicksian full equilibrium occurs "not merely when demands equal 
supplies at the currently established prices," that is at such points as 
R, H, J, and so on, but "also when the same prices continue to rule at 
all dates." The latter situation, at point M, represents equilibrium 
over time, or long-run equilibrium, and will be the only position sanc­
tioned by the Walrasian auctioneer.^ From that point onwards, Walrasian 
general equilibrium is perpetually maintained, barring some change in 
some exogenous variable: the real money stock does not change from this
point onwards. Note that changes in the stock of real balances would 
imply excess supply or demand for commodities, which cannot be allowed 
in long-run equilibrium.
Consider now, in Figure 2, an increase in real balances from an 
initial position of equilibrium at M. Let real balances grow from NM to 
NS. The budget line will shift to QT and the utility maximizer will find 
himself at S, the intersection of the new budget line with the perpendi­
cular at the unchanging real income level, N. The same mechanism 
described in the previous paragraph will drive the utility maximizer to M.
On the other hand, an increase in real income from ON to OP (in 
figure 3) will shift the budget line from QS to RT, with the eventual 
new equilibrium moving from M on the old budget line to V on the new.
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that changes along the 
vertical axis, which represents real balances, will in no way influence 
relative prices or the quantity of the composite commodity represented 
on the horizontal axis. Note also that the ultimate, equilibrium posi­
tion along the budget line is defined and completely determined by the 
level of real commodity output and the expansion path. Although 
desired money holdings are recognized as being determined by the choice
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criteria of utility maximizers (as described along the expansion path), 
the monetary sector could justifiably be called a passive appendage to 
the real (commodity) sector. Production and exchange conditions in the 
commodity sector determine the real quantity of the composite commodity 
and the relative price structure within that composite commodity. With 
the utility map determining the expansion path, the quantity of real 
balances is endogenous and will change in relation to the quantity of 
real output, in a relationship defined by the expansion path. Monetary 
policy as we understand the term, is neutral and insignificant. Any 
change in the money supply has no' effect on relative prices, real out­
put or total utility. There is therefore a transmission mechanism, but 
its effect is purely on an irrelevant variable, the absolute price 
level, which does not enter the utility function. The only relevant 
monetary variable is determined endogenously, not by the money supplier.
These results emerge from the nature of a utility function,which 
bears closer examination. The utility function is homogeneous of degree 
zero in the nominal money stock and all prices
U = U(q^» ^2’ ^1’ ^2’ ’** ^n^
If all the variables to the right of the semi-colon were to double, for
example, total utility would remain unchanged. As resources are fully 
employed and the economy is satiated with real money balances, total 
utility is taken to its highest possible level U*. Monetary satiation 
is assured by the homogeneity postulate: changes in absolute prices
will take real money balances to their desired level, without having 
any other repercussions on the economy. With U as U*, any changes in 
M, given the homogeneity postulate will require proportionately equi­
valent changes in all prices for equilibrium to be restored. The
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homogenei-ty postulate is the reason for the neutrality of money.
The statement "money is neutral" means that, following a change 
in the money supply, the exchange rate between any pair of commodities 
will return to its original position by the time the system returns to 
an equilibrium position. In other words, the relative price of nominal 
money in terms of each of the various commodities will change by the 
same proportion. We can restate the above as follows:
■^pi/pi = "2>M/M for any i,
and ^(p^/Pj)/3H = 0 for any i,j,
which will hold only if
B(Ui/Uj)/aM = 0 for any i,j.
where i,j are commodities, M is money and U is the social utility func­
tion. 8
Situational Determinism and the Money Supply 
There can be little doubt that this monetary model shares all the 
propositions of the hard-core of neoclassical research program repro­
duced from Latsis in Chapter 1 and also observes all the instructions in 
the positive heuristic of that program. Proposition (i) dealing with 
the adequacy of knowledge and proposition (ii) concerning optimization 
are both met in the monetary model. Situational determinism— the 
essence of proposition (iii) of the hard-core, and also required by 
instruction (c) of the positive-heuristic— is very evident too: the
path to long-run equilibrium at the intersection of the real income line 
and the expansion path is inevitable and obvious. The model is static 
[positive heuristic(a)], amenable to the calculus [positive heuristic 
(d)], and clean of absolutely all non-economic content [positive
heuristic(b)].
The previous paragraph addressed itself to various aspects of mone­
tary demand and monetary equilibrium. It may be fruitful to reevaluate 
the neoclassical situational determinism from a different angle: how
does it manifest itself with regard to the money supply? To rephrase 
this question, how does money compare with an ordinary commodity? The 
supply of the latter in the neoclassical theory of the firm is character­
ized by situational determinism. Can the same be said of the money 
stock?
Viewed as a real quantity, money in the neoclassical model is simi­
lar, in many respects, to any other good. For example, an increase in 
the money supply from a situation of equilibrium, where all exogenous 
variables and parameters remain unchanged, will eventually totally re­
verse itself. An increase in the money stock which represents, say, an 
experiment on the part of the central bank will temporarily constitute 
an increase in the real stock of money; but since the system was at rest 
to start with, and because there was no change in any of the exogenous 
variables or parameters, the system will eventually return to the status 
quo ante, with the real money stock back at its original level. There 
is here a close parallel with what would happen in a perfectly competi­
tive economy where producers of some commodity, although already maxi­
mizing their profits, decided as an experiment to produce more of their 
product. The excess supply would depress the price sufficiently for 
all of their output to be sold, but the new price would be uneconomic 
enough to induce the sellers to cut production back to its original 
level; the relative price would follow suit. Similarly, an increase in 
the real money stock will reverse itself, and the only difference
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between the old and the new equilibrium will be in the absolute price 
level.
This analogy breaks down, however, on closer investigation. In 
the real world, market forces do not usually penalize the producers of 
money for their additional output. One also notes that, while the pro­
ducers of the commodity unilaterally reduced their output after finding 
themselves unable to sell their higher level of output at the original 
price, the same is not true of money producers; it is not by way of any 
act of money producers that the money stock returns to its original 
level.
Note also that in the commodity example, neoclassical theory pre­
dicts that the new equilibrium price will be identical to that at the 
old equilibrium. So to carry on with the analogy we have to identify 
the relative price of real money. By analogy with the commodity indus­
try, we would expect the relative price of real money to return to its 
old level at the new equilibrium. Here we run into conceptual problems. 
Real money has by its very definition a fixed rate of exchange. A 
dollar at 1956 prices is always what a dollar would have bought in 1956. 
The analogy with the commodity industry collapses once we recognize 
that, while the relative price of a commodity will change during dis­
equilibrium and finally return to its original level, in the case of 
the money industry the relative price of real money cannot be said to 
return to its original position, since it cannot, by its very defini­
tion, ever deviate from it in the first place.
One can easily argue that these difficulties in applying regular 
economic analysis to money arose only because the analysis was framed 
in terms of the real money stock. The actual liabilities of the money
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issue are really— in a legal sense— nominal units, in much the same way 
as the physical quantity of commodities is best represented by measure­
ment in real terms. This, of course, coincides with the neoclassical 
view that what the authorities have a handle on is the nominal money 
stock but that the real money stock is out of their control and is 
entirely in the hands of the public. Let us therefore tackle the same 
exercise afresh, this time using the nominal money stock as our unit of 
analysis. Again consider a starting position of equilibrium which is 
disturbed by an increase in the money stock. Neoclassical theory would 
predict that the nominal money stock will remain permanently at its 
higher level, and so will the absolute price level. The absolute price 
level represents the relationship of the set of the relative prices of 
nominal money now to the set at some reference point in time. This 
means that the theory will predict that the relative price of nominal 
money will remain permanently at its higher level.
In other words, unlike the commodity industry, the money industry 
incorporates no mechanism which would correct a deviation from its 
equilibrium position. If the issuer of money responded to market 
stimuli in the fashion of the commodity producer who was discussed 
above, then we could start at a position representing equilibrium to 
the producer; any deviation from this position not warranted by change 
in any of the exogenous variables or parameters would lead to further 
changes which would in turn evoke corrective action on the part of the 
producer, back to the old equilibrium.^
Instead the nominal money stock cannot be said to be in, or out 
of equilibrium: it is an exogenous variable. This has implications
for Latsis' views on the situational determinism of neoclassical
46
theory. In neoclassical monetary theory, there certainly is situational 
determinism on the demand side for money. The demand is for real 
balances and is treated on a par with the demand for commodities: it
is subject to the utility-maximizer's choice criteria as manifested in 
the utility map. The model is built in such a way that the "logic of 
the situation" requires the utility-maximizer to go to the intersection 
of the real output line and the expansion path, in the same manner as 
the perfectly competitive firm goes to the lowest point of the average 
cost curve. On the supply side, however, the money stock should be 
viewed only in nominal terms and here, situational determinism cannot 
be said to apply. Viewed in nominal terms, the money supply is not 
determinate. The criteria for its determination are indicated.
How could such an important variable as the money supply, the size 
of which is nowadays subject to so much debate, be put, in neoclassical 
theory, on a par with rainfall or the plague? The question of the 
money supply, as important as it is today, is irrelevant within the 
terms of neoclassical theory. We saw above that the consequences of 
monetary changes were of little significance; they are restricted to 
absolute prices and had nothing to do with the important variables, 
namely relative prices and output. This theory is the product of an 
age when the economy was not studied in macroeconomic terms. Money is, 
after all, a macroeconomic variable, and the situational determinism 
talked about by Latsis is microeconomic. It applies only to micro- 
economic agents.
Conclusion
This chapter was a discussion of neo-Walrasian monetary theory as
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part of the neoclassical program to which it belongs. The chapter also 
elaborated on situational determinism which characterizes the monetary 
behavior of microeconomic agents. This situational determinism does 
not apply, however, to the supply of money. The neoclassical theory 
has nothing to say about the determination of the quantity of money, 
which is, in any event, a variable of minor relevance to the model. It 
bears stressing that the agents mentioned in the neoclassical program 
are strictly microeconomic agents.
The reader will recall that an instruction in the neoclassical 
positive heuristic in Chapter 1 asked the theorist to make the model 
as realistic as possible. In pursuit of this objective, Clower and 
Burstein, for example, adapt the Archibald and Lipsey model- presented 
diagrammatically above (see section on the real balance effect, page 
above) to an economy which has financial assets and liabilities.^'*' 
Financial intermediation leaves the neutrality of money intact. De­
spite adaptations of this kind,.the neoclassical program is limited in 
its applicability to practical, macroeconomic policy issues. The 
following chapter looks at radical, macroeconomic departures from the 




^This section puts together some of the ideas contained in D. Patinkin, 
Money, interest and prices, an integration of monetary and value 
theory, 2nd edition, New York: Harper and Row, 1965 (part 1); F. H.
Hahn, "The rate of interest and the general equilibrium analysis," 
Economic Journal, 1955, 65, pp. 52-56; G. L. S. Shackle, "Recent 
theories concerning the nature and role of interest," Surveys of 
economic theory, volume 1, prepared for the American Economic 
Association and the Royal Economic Society, London: Macmillan,
1965. Other relevant surveys are contained in H. G. Johnson, 
"Monetary theory and policy" and "Recent developments in monetary 
theory," both reprinted in R. S. Thorn, Ed., Monetary theory and 
policy, major contributions to contemporary thought, New York: 
Praeger, 1976.
P^. Mini, Philosophy and economics, Gainesville, Florida: University
Presses of Florida, 1974, especially Chapters 6 and 7.
^There is another dichotomy within the first six equations. The subset 
(1) through (3) determines s, i and r, while q, L and W/P are deter­
mined separately inequations (4) through (6).
^If the economy had only one commodity, money may or may not be needed. 
But what is being discussed here is a model with only one commodity, 
where a number of commodities is collapsed, for purposes of simpli­
fication, into one.
5The next four paragraphs reproduce the neo-Walrasian equilibrium ana­
lysis contained in G. C. Archibald and R, G. Lipsey, "Monetary and 
value theory: a critique of Lange and Patinkin," Review of Economic 
Studies, 1958, 26, pp. 1-22. The diagrammatic presentation may en­
counter the objection that the vertical axis represents a time- 
independent stock entity, while the horizontal axis measures a time- 
dependent flow. However, there is nothing wrong in entrusting the 
rational agent with a choice between a stock and a flow.
^J. R. Hicks, Value and capital, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1946.
P^. A. Samuelson, "What classical and neo-classical monetary theory
really was," Canadian Journal of Economics, 1968, JL, No. 1, pp. 1-15.
%or the sake of completeness, this note adds a general equilibrium
model for a monetized economy (Model 2 below), patterned after P. A 
Samuelson, (op. cit.) and two additional models for comparison.
Model 1 contains six equilibrium conditions for a nonmonetized 
economy where capital (K) is the numeraire, and solves for 6 unknowns 
Pf/PRj w/pK’ r> Ql> ^2* T^e p 's stand for nominal money
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Chapter note 8, continued
Model 1
UQ1 P1/PK
UQ1Q1 + UQ2Q2 + rK
UQ2 _ P2/PK
UQ2<*2 + u qiq i + rK
(1)
(2)
<Sf/6L = W/Pk (3)




Chapter note 8, continued
Model 2




(1) Same as in Model 2.
(2) tl  II
6f/6L ■= W/PK (3) tl I
6f/6K = r W I I
UQ1 V PK (5) I It
UqiQi + uq2q2 + V WL/Pr + r(K+M)
UQ2 P2/pK (6) I It
UQlQ l * UQ2Q2 + V
WL/Pk + r (K+M)
UM r (7)
UM
UQlQl + uq2q2 + V WL/Pk + r (K+M) V ^ l + UQ2Q2 +UMM
1/PV
M = M (8) Same as in Model 2.
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prices. W is the nominal wage; r is the interest rate; the Q’s are 
the two final commodities. The two factors of production, L (labor) 
and K are in fixed supply; replacement capital maintains the capital 
stock at a constant level. The production function is of the 
Rarasey-Solow type; the ratio of the marginal cost of each commodity 
to the marginal cost of capital is constant. Hence the derivation 
of marginal equivalences (1) and (2). U represents the utility 
function; f the production function.
Monetization requires the inclusion of a new set of utility 
maximizing equivalences: (5), (6), and (7) in Model 2. U is homo­
geneous of degree zero in 11 and all the P's. In this model, equa­
tions (1) through (7) contain seven unknowns: ^i/Pr ’ P2 ^ K ’
r> Q] > Q2 anc^  The addition of the eighth equation introduces
the money supply and allows for the solution of a further unknown: 
in place of the seven unknowns above, we can now solve for Pj^ , Pj_,
P2 , W, r, Q-^ , Q29 and M. In other words, equation (8) determines 
all absolute prices.
We shall now have a closer look at factor prices in Model 2.
Here W/Pjr represents the rate of exchange of labor for final goods 
(expressed in capital units) in the factor marketplace. Equation 
(3) states that this rate of exchange will equal, in equilibrium, 
the rate of exchange of labor for output (expressed in capital 
units) in the production process. Likewise, the interest rate r 
represents the amount of output (expressed in capital units) earned 
by one unit of capital per unit of time, and equals (in equation (4) 
the rate of exchange of capital per unit of time for output (express­
ed in capital units). Note, however, that the interest rate serves 
in this model also as the cost of money, in contrast to our earlier 
procedure where we had the price level fulfill that function. This 
dual role of the interest rate rests on the notion of endowing money 
with the function of a store of value. The interest rate represents, 
for Samuelson, the return on alternative forms of wealth: in hold­
ing money, the wealth holder loses the flow of services he would 
have earned from these. The absolute price level, in contrast, 
represents the quantity of the composite good that has to be foregone 
in order to obtain a unit of money.
Whether the interest rate or the absolute price level is the 
true price of money is a thorny issue, which will not be discussed 
here. Should r in equation (7) of Model 2 be replaced by 1/P^j we 
would end up with Model 3. Here, the first seven equations contain 
seven unknowns: Pi/Pr» ^2^K> ^/Pr» r» Ql> ^2 ’ anc* ^/^K> t*ie same
set of unknowns as in the first 7 equations of Model 2. The addi­
tion of the eight equations permits, as before, the determination 
of absolute prices.
Because of the homogeneity postulate, money is neutral in both 
Model 2 and Model 3.
Of his model, Samuelson writes that, 11. . . correct neoclassi­
cal theory does not lead to the narrow anti-Keynesian view of those 
Chicago economists who allege that velocity of circulation is not a 
function of interest rates." That much having been granted, one 
hastens to add that, unlike Keynesian theory, neoclassical theory 
does not allow the money supply to influence the interest rate, even 
though the interest rate enters into the demand function for money.
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^On this matter, see also S. Ahmad, "Is money net wealth?," Oxford 
Economic Papers, 1970, 22^ , pp. 357-361.
■*-fy)ne may argue that our earlier account of the mpnetary process— the 
part where we looked at the money supply in real terms, and which 
we later rejected in favor of an analysis in nominal terms— over­
stated the power of monetary changes. Archibald and Lipsey (note 
5 above) use the concepts of the Walrasian auctioneer and tatonne- 
ment to analyze the periods between equilibrium. By their account, 
upon a change in the money supply— suppose the money supply is 
doubled— the system goes into disequilibrium, trading is suspended 
and the auctioneer is called to duty. No trading takes place until 
the auctioneer calls the equilibrium prices, at which point all 
prices are double their previous-equilibrium level. Also at this 
point, the real money stock will be back at its original level. By 
this sort of approach, monetary changes influence what goes on dur­
ing tatonnement, but have no effect whatsoever on trading. One 
cannot conclude that monetary changes have no effect on economic 
transactions, since the dealings of the auctioneer during the 
tatonnement constitute economic transactions. However, monetary 
changes have no effect on the actual, "real" trading. This leads 
Archibald and Lipsey to conclude that "[for] those well-known 
propositions of the quantity theory which are propositions in com­
parative statics, the real-balance effect is irrelevant."
H. Clower and M. L. Burstein, "On the invariance of demand for 




The controversy over what Keynes really meant is not relevant to 
our study. In the light of our discussion on methodology in Chapter 1, 
what is significant is not so much what Keynes said as what he was 
understood to have said. Social scientists become important not on the
v
basis of what they "really" say, but rather by virtue of their contri­
bution to the direction of thought in their discipline. The work of 
one author is likely to form only part of a research program, and the 
success of a program will depend on the generation and later corrobora­
tion of testable hypotheses over long stretches of time rather than on 
the strength of one particular theory or set of theories. It follows 
that an understanding of the major currents in Keynesian thinking is 
more important than the literal significance of the General Theory or 
any other major Keynesian work. This is not, however, to deny the rele­
vance of Clower, Leijonhufvud, Hines and others who sought the "real" 
meaning of the General Theory, since these authors not only contributed 
useful insights into Keynesian theory, but also represent a significant, 
if not major undercurrent in modern economics.
Describing Keynesian theory, to be juxtaposed against its neoclas­
sical counterpart, could be a difficult task. A student educated along 
Anglo-American lines will probably recognize the transition from the 
neoclassical to the Keynesian model by a switch from the microeconomic 
(including a theory of general equilibrium rich in microeconomic detail)
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to the macroeconomic, with solutions involving disequilibrium (particu­
larly in the labor market) becoming a routine matter. Fiscal policy, 
while not excluded from neoclassical theory, becomes more of a panacea. 
Monetary policy, which was quite impotent in the neoclassical model, 
becomes theoretically significant, but very serious doubts emerge as to 
its efficacy.
Keynesian theory as we have come to know it is certainly no
thoroughbred. Mating it with neoclassicism was a major effort of Alvin
Hansen, Bent Hansen, Hicks and others, and the success of the breeding
may account for our difficulties in spelling out what makes a theory
Keynesian. Take for example, Bent Hansen's variant of Klein's version
of the Keynesian model.-*- Klein's original is on the left; as rewritten
in a supply-and-demand format by Hansen on the right.
S/p - f(r,Y/p) C/p = f*(r,Y/p)
I/p = g(r,Y/p) I/p = g(r,Y/p)
I = S Y/p = C/p + I/p
M/p = L(r,Y/p) Y/p = qs
Y = pq qs = qs(Nd)
q = q(N) Nd q_1(w/p)
w/p = ql(N) Ns = h(w/p)
Ns = h(w/p) Md/p - L(r,Y/p)
Ms/p = M/p
Md = Ms
The addition of a labor-market equilibrium equation (N = Ns) would 
transform either model into a neoclassical model. If instead we add an 
identity defining the exogenously determined wage, we end up with a 
Keynesian model. The one on the right would have 11 equations to solve 
11 unknowns, among which would be the price level. Indeed, if we re­
write all the equations in real terms and omit the price-level variable 
we are left with the spectacle of a Keynesian model which is overdeter­
mined for lack of a price level variable. Hansen sought to demonstrate
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that rewriting a Keynesian model in a supply-and-demand format would 
transform it into a special, rigid-wage, case of the neoclassical model.
Before we come to grips with the Hansen model on the right, a few 
introductory comments are in order. As with the model in Chapter 2, 
Hansen's neoclassical version can be segmented into two parts: the
first seven equations plus the labor market equation determine C/p, r, 
Y/p, I/p, qs, N^, Ng and w/p, while the last three determine M^, and 
p. In other words, the model complies with the neoclassical dichotomy 
of real from monetary variables. While the price level is determined 
exclusively in the monetary sector, the determination of the interest 
rate lies squarely in the real sector: the Hicksian IS-LM synthesis
(yet to be born, in 1937) is unknown here. The same fundamental ques­
tion raised in Chapter 2 can be asked again: if p were determined
purely in the monetary sector, how can it honestly perform its function 
as the relative price of goods in terms of money? A true relative price 
will influence the desired ratios of goods to money, but also will it­
self be influenced by the supply of either.
The inclusion of income as a determinant of consumption and invest­
ment must have raised the eyebrows of many a neoclassicist. Optimal 
allocation is a matter of relative prices and in the neoclassical tradi­
tion, income is no constraint since the economic agent can borrow his 
way across time periods with complete disregard for his current income. 
So there is no way to derive logically a general equilibrium model with 
an income constraint if one's starting point is a partial microeconomic 
model, as it should be when one is building a general equilibrium model. 
Fallacy of composition? Hardly; it is true that an entire society, in 
a closed model (that is, one without international commerce) cannot
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borrow or lend, but a general equilibrium model builds from microagent 
behavior upwards, and intertemporal relative prices in such a model will 
ensure there is no net borrowing or lending at the macroeconomic level. 
Glower’s observation^ on the addition of income constraints in macro­
economics— that they reflect the recognition that when markets do not 
clear and "false trading" (that is, exchange at non-equilibrium prices) 
takes place, less-than-equilibrium or constrained incomes are a neces­
sary independent variable in demand functions— led to Leijonhufvud’s 
well-known reinterpretation of Keynes.^
But disequilibria in the Walrasian sense are difficult to discuss 
in the context of Hansen’s Keynesian model, where the labor market is 
in permanent disequilibrium. By Walras’ Law, one other equation should 
also be out of equilibrium. The excess supply in the labor market will 
be matched by an excess demand in this other equation for a net excess 
demand of zero in all markets. But which equation? The money market 
is said to clear, usually at an equilibrium interest rate. This leaves 
us with the output market. The problem with this market is that no 
prices are included among the independent variables in the output demand 
equations. Indeed, the absence of prices from those two equations would 
seem to place the Hansen model out of range of Walras' Law. So our 
suggestion above that prices be included in the output demand equation 
bears rethinking: the model is damned in neoclassical eyes if the out­
put demand equations lack the price variable, but if a price variable 
is included, it is still damned, since it will certainly fail the test 
of Walras’ Law, unless it allows for the money or output markets to be 
in permanent equilibrium.
On the incompatibility of his model with Walras' Law, Hansen writes
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that
the answer . . . seems to be that in Keynesian theory, workers 
are assumed not to expect to sell all the labour which they 
supply. They expect to sell only what is actually demanded.
Their expected income is therefore smaller than the value of 
their supply of labour and equal to what they actually happen 
to sell. . . .5
Why the expectations of workers with regard *to uwrket clearance are 
formed in a manner different from those of other economic agents is 
never explained.
The foregoing suggests some logical problems in dressing the 
Keynesian model in neoclassical clothes, but we need a stronger criter­
ion to help us determine the connection, if any, between the two, or 
whether the two schools are completely irreconcilable.
Say’s Law
Such a criterion can perhaps be found in Chapter 1, particularly 
after page 9 . There, the discussion of Lakatos suggested that differ­
ent programs generate different testable hypotheses, and then the 
progress or otherwise of a program depends on whether these hypotheses 
are corroborated. This procedure is especially suitable for the natural 
sciences. In the social sciences, however, one has to keep in mind that 
hypotheses often take the form of policy recommendations and that corro­
boration could then come in the form of a successful policy outcome.
Seen in this light, the Keynesian-neoclassical dispute represents a 
clash between irreconcilable policy recommendations. It may be seen to 
revolve around the one crucial policy question: how well do markets 
fulfill their function of allocating resources? The one fundamental 
premise underlying neoclassical economics is that they are uniquely 
suited for the job. Keynesian economics on the other hand casts a
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serious doubt. Dressing a Keynesian model in neoclassical clothes may 
be useful to facilitate the conversion of members of the profession 
whose hearts belong to the Keynesian philosophy but whose upbringing 
was elsewhere. In line with our discussion in Chapter 1, a switch in 
research programs can be especially hard on the old guard. The protec­
tive belt of a young progressive program may well veer toward the con­
tent of the competing degenerating program; this would make the transi­
tion easier for all.
This argument can be usefully recast in terms of Say’s Law. By 
Hutt's interpretation,6 Say’s Law can be expressed as follows: If
prices are allowed to find their own level, no resources will be unem­
ployed. Equivalently, any unemployment of resources can be attributed 
to some activity which incapacitates the workings of the market and 
prevents the emergence of equilibrium prices. If Say’s Law is accepted, 
the policy implication would follow that unemployment of, say, labor 
can be attributed to monopolistic or monopsonistic practices which ob­
struct the emergence of an equilibrium real wage. Unemployment in such 
circumstances would be due not to a lack of aggregate demand, but to a 
deficiency of supply. This belief in the smooth workings of the market 
goes hand in hand with the recommendation against government super­
imposing itself on the market, and against monopoly- or monopsony- 
induced distortions. Expanding government expenditures will not pull 
the economy out of a recession, since such an expansion would consti­
tute an increase in demand, which is the wrong medicine. Breaking up 
the monopolies or labor unions would break the stranglehold on the free 
movement of prices, and expand supply, leading the economy back to full 
employment.
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If Say’s Law is not accepted, however, the policy maker would be 
well advised to add directly to the employment of resources, since in 
the absence of such government involvement markets cannot be entrusted 
with the task of finding the appropriate prices for full employment.
The presence or absence of money does not alter the argument in 
the least from the point of view of the proponents of Say’s Law. In 
the eyes of the supporters of the price mechanism, the concept of with­
held demand is absurd. Selling one’s products and retaining the pro­
ceeds in the fora of money rather than buying other people's products 
can in no way cause unemployment.' The most that can happen is the 
emergence of a new set of relative prices. A new equilibrium will 
emerge consonant with the structure of preferences. Two underlying 
premises are transparent: holding money is as rational a choice as that
involved in any economic decision; furthermore, the market can handle 
such an eventuality with as much ease as it can handle any switch in 
preferences. For the opponents of Say’s Law, on the other hand, money 
is the very stuff of disequilibria. If markets cannot be trusted to 
generate equilibria, the money market is likely to end up as Walrasian 
receptacle of the excess demand counterpart to the excess supply of 
labor and other unemployed resources.
Supporters of the market mechanism are likely to prefer using
microeconomic models, since it is only within such a framework that the
market can display its ability to allocate resources appropriately.
The result is the neoclassical microeconomic research program of
7
Chapter I. Quirk and Saposnik might well argue that macroeconomics is 
a special case of the general equilibrium model, where the complexity 
of the latter is reduced to a model with one consumer, one producer
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plus the government. The fact remains, however, that the intricate web 
of relative prices and the attendant allocative process is all but lost 
in Keynesian macroeconomics. Hansen's model above is less than neoclas­
sical in at least that one major aspect.
Keynesian macroeconomics is by its very nature unsympathetic to the 
workings of the market, and this is reflected in its methodology.
Method in Keynes seems to have followed Keynes' reading of his environ­
ment; witness this quotation from The Economic Consequences of Sterling
O
Parity: ". . . we run a risk of reaching the wrong conclusion . . .
if we continue to apply the principles of an Economics which was worked 
out on the hypothesis of laisser-faire and free competition to a society 
which is rapidly abandoning these hypotheses."
In the language of Simon (Chapter 1 above) the decomposition in 
Keynesian models stops at a macroeconomic level. For the most part, 
they ignore microeconomic variables, and as a result, the method of 
specification ignores the web of microeconomic relationships.
Portfolio Balance 
The portfolio-balance method is nowadays very popular among macro­
economists, and its appeal is common to both Keynesians and non-Keynes­
ians. Because of the latter, we shall return to it in the next chapter, 
but at this stage it is pertinent to mention that Keynes is regarded by 
Patinkin^ as the founder of the concept of the transmission mechanism 
in the modern sense of the word. Portfolio adjustment is a domino-like 
effect in the relative price structure of assets and appears to be a 
sophisticated exercise in price adjustment, rich in disaggregated de­
tail.
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Patinkin attributes to Keynes the modern notion of money as a 
stock. Prior to Keynes, money was perceived as a flow; the demand for 
money was related to income, itself a flow. The detachment of money 
from income, and the consequent movement away from the medium-of-ex- 
change function towards the store-of-value function began with the 
Cambridge equation of exchange and culminated in Keynes, where money 
started to be treated as a stock. The portfolio owner holds money as 
well as other assets in a ratio consistent with the price structure of 
assets, and a change in the volume of money would require a new set of 
relative prices among assets. As elaborated by T o b i n , t h e  particular 
substitutability amongst the various financial assets and then between 
these and real, physical assets will determine the transmission of the 
initial monetary change through a path leading to the ultimate impact 
on the real economy.
It should be noted in passing, however, that the Keynesian mechan­
ism has none of the complexities of, say, Friedman's model, which will 
be dealt with in Chapter 4. The Keynesian model can be said to contain 
three assets: money, financial capital and real capital. The latter
two are substitutes. This contrasts with Friedman's mechanism, where 
the variety of channels and the multitude of variables involved suggests 
a higher regard for microeconomic detail and the allocative role of 
relative prices.
Deference to microeconomics and the subjective, individualistic 
method is evident also in a much earlier work: The Theory of Money and
Credit by Ludwig von Ilises.^ It must be granted that even though the 
original German text came out well before the General Theory, portfolio 
adjustment per se was not alien to von Mises, Patinkin's claims on
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behalf of Keynes notwithstanding. Von Mises writes:
He who has more money on hand than he thinks he needs, will buy, 
in order to dispose of the superfluous stock of money that lies 
useless on his hands. If he is an entrepreneur, he will possi­
bly enlarge his business. If this use of money is not open to 
him, he may purchase interest-bearing securities; or possibly 
he may decide to purchase consumption goods. But in any case, 
he expresses by a suitable behavior in the market the fact that 
he regards his reserve of purchasing power as too large.12
One must do justice to Patinkin's position and admit that von Mises 
never talks of a relative asset price structure corresponding to the 
set of asset stocks. Yet if one reads on, The Theory of Money and 
Credit, as well as other Austrian-school literature, provide more than 
a clue as to why such a development had to await the General Theory.
As the next section shows, an Austrian-type method would deal with 
money in a disaggregated fashion, while the macroeconomic portfolio 
approach (Keynesian or otherwise) deals with the macroeconomic consequ­
ences of a monetary change, primarily on the interest rate and on asset 
prices.
A Microeconomic, Individualistic Treatment of Saving.
Investment and Money 
Saving can be viewed as the expression of a preference of future 
goods over present goods. Likewise, investment can be regarded as the 
manifestation of a preference for present over future goods. In other 
words, investors demand capital goods at the present time, and will be 
in a position to supply in the future goods produced with the help of 
these capital goods. That the demand for present goods is made against 
the offer of claims on future goods rather than against the future 
goods themselves does not in itself influence our eventual conclusions. 
At this stage, therefore, we can ignore the web of financial
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intermediation which stands atop real transactions. Instead of a market 
where saving and investment are equated at an equilibrium interest rate, 
there is the supply and demand for commodities— as usual, except that 
commodities are delivered in different time periods, and the prices 
determined in the various markets are the prices of the commodities each 
defined as of a particular point in time. The interest rate can now be 
defined as the ratio of the price of a commodity at a future point in 
time to the price of the same commodity at the present time. There is 
no reason why the ratio for one good should be the same as for any other 
good, except that as the economy moves towards equilibrium differences 
in such ratios would lead to a reallocation of resources until uniform 
ratios are established throughout the economy by the time the next 
general equilibrium is achieved.
An increase in savings can now be interpreted as an increased pre­
ference of future over present goods. This changes the rate of exchange 
of future for present goods. The quantity of present goods exchanging 
for the same quantity of future goods rises, implying a decline in the 
rate of interest. For example, whereas before the switch in preferences 
towards saving, 100 units of a present good exchanged for 106 units of 
that same good in the future, implying an interest rate of 6%, now 101 
units of the present good will exchange for 106 units in the future, 
equivalent to an interest rate of under 6q. The price of present goods 
in terms of future goods will fall; the price of future goods rises as 
will the price of claims on future goods, if we incorporate financial 
intermediation into our analysis. In other words, the price of an 
asset and the yield on such an asset move in opposite directions.
Money can be integrated into such an approach without undue
difficulty. Newly-issued money constitutes a claim on goods and ser­
vices. Here it can be perceived as a flow of claims filtering down to 
microeconomic agents, and prompting a redistribution within the economy. 
Whether the interest will rise or fall depends on whether the recipients 
prefer future goods to present goods or vice versa. It may so happen 
that if the government, for example, transfers newly-created money to 
poor recipients of public welfare funds, the consequent redistribution 
would probably raise the price of present goods in terms of future goods. 
Conversely the usual prediction of a drop in the interest rate upon an 
increase in the quantity of money will obtain if a redistribution occurs 
leading to an increased preference for future goods.
There remains, however, a fundamental difference between an in­
crease in saving which results from a change in preferences amongst 
economic agents and one which ensues from a redistribution of wealth 
following an increase in the quantity of money which favors those in 
whose preference structure future goods feature more prominently. A 
change in preference leads to a permanent change in the interest rate, 
reflecting an alteration in the equilibrium rate of exchange of future 
for present goods. When a redistribution occurs as a result of monetary 
expansion, on the other hand, the subsequent change in interest rate can 
be viewed as a superimposition on the economy which is more likely to be 
reversed as the proceeds of the initial monetary expansion are respent 
over and over again. A theoretical model with the appropriate institu­
tional detail can be set up to guarantee the long-term neutrality of 
money.^
The distinguishing characteristic of the approach discussed above 
is perhaps that the interest rate is determined in periods of
1
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disequilibrium as well as in equilibrium, along with all other relative 
prices, through an intricate web of microeconomic activity. With the 
appropriate institutional backdrop, more elaborate models can be set 
up. In Hayek, for example, the effects of a monetary expansion on the 
methods of production are looked at in detail. Production is broken up 
into various stages which link present goods at one end to future goods 
at the other. A switch in preferences towards future goods will not 
merely raise the price of future goods and make the production of such
f
goods more attractive, but will also make production at any stage of 
production more attractive relative to earlier stages, thereby prompt­
ing a lengthening of the production process. The short-run effects of 
a monetary expansion can also be viewed through the use of a similar 
theoretical apparatus.
The Keynesian portfolio approach, in contrast, is essentially a 
macroeconomic approach, and by virtue of its macro nature, is able to 
handle money as an aggregate quantity. Instead of viewing an increase 
in the quantity of money as an increase in the claims (on goods and 
services) made available to so many microeconomic agents, whereupon the 
disposal of such claims leads to the eventual repercussions on the real 
economy, now we can talk directly of a market for money at a macroscale 
determining a macroeconomic interest rate which in the Keynesian age 
came to be viewed as the price of money. There is nothing logically 
incorrect with the asset-price and interest rate movements which the 
Tobin-Keynesian theory predicts will occur across the macro-portfolio 
of assets following a monetary expansion. Likewise it is logically 
acceptable to posit perfect substitutability between financial assets 




differences in risk, assets enter preference structures only via their 
rates of return. Yet this new method, which instructs the theorist to 
analyze economic activity in macroscopic terras has the advantage of 
viewing money, a macro quantity, in suitable theoretical dimensions, 
but the disadvantage of possibly missing relevant microeconomic detail.
A Keynesian Research Program
In a Lakatosian reconstruction of Keynesian theories, the positive 
heuristic veers the theorist away from the microeconomic, in a manner 
which distinguishes the resulting theories both from the neoclassical 
types we saw in Chapter 2 as well as the Austrians presented in this 
chapter. The Keynesian theorist is also required to address himself or 
herself to policy questions. This mission is not inconsistent with the 
Austrian school, but is removed from the Walrasian theories of Chapter 
2. The Keynesian positive heuristic would read:
(a) Construct aggregative economic models.
(b) Minimize the non-economic content.
(c) Analyze macroeconomic stabilization.
(d) Adapt the models to make them as acceptable 
as possible to neoclassicists.
The first instruction sets the macroeconomic tone. The second 
instructs the theorist to avoid non-economic content. In particular, 
Keynesian models generally avoid sociological and political detail.
The result is a situational determinism, which is different from that 
of microeconomic models and which will be the subject of the conclusion 
of this chapter. The third instruction permits the theorist to study 
systems which to a neoclassicist were unstable or in short-term dis- 
equilibria. The fourth heuristic is an exercise in public relations 
and an appeasement of the old guard.
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The hard core of the Keynesian program consists of one proposition:
(i) Economic activity is the outcome of the interaction 
of private markets and macroeconomic policy.
History of the Keynesian Program
Had we regarded Keynesian theory as belonging in the protective 
belt of the neoclassical program, then the 40's, 50's and part of the 
60's would have had to be viewed as a time of re-invigoration and pro­
gression in neoclassicism, thanks to Keynesian addenda, after the 
debacle and regression of the Great Depression. If, on the other hand, 
we view Keynesianism, as we have in this chapter, as a separate research 
program, the history of its component theories is a good example of a 
Lakatosian degenerating program. The verdict on the matter depends, of 
course, on one's particular views of the history of Keynesianism. Here, 
however, is one attempt at a Lakatosian reconstruction of the develop­
ment of Keynesian thought.
1. The starting point must be the 45-degree model of Alvin Hansen 
and Paul Samuelson, which was strictly macroeconomic and which had 
little to say about the absolute price level at all output positions 
short of full employment. The model came hand in hand with the recom­
mendation for an active fiscal policy.
2. The Hicksian IS-LM model^ was primarily a theoretical refine­
ment, although it has since undergone independent testing. In the very 
early formulations of Keynesianism, the interest rate determined the 
level of investment, which in turn determined (via the multiplier) the 
level of income; yet the latter was itself a determinant, in the liqui­
dity function, of the interest rate. The IS-LM technique integrated the
system, and an ignominious circularity in logic was transformed into a
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model with as many equations as it has unknowns.
3. In Keynesian theory, emphasis is switched away from price ad­
justment (the sort of adjustment which is the essence of a well-func­
tioning market system) to quantity adjustment. By the very nature of 
this departure, which plays down the role of price fluctuations as an 
equilibrating mechanism in the market economy, Keynesian theory should 
have lost its credentials as a credible explanation of the inflationary 
process, which consists after all of a sequence of price movements.
Since the early Keynesian models downplayed the role of price changes, 
let alone came up with adequate proposals for controlling inflation, 
the protective belt eventually had to be adjusted, to incorporate for­
mally the rate of inflation into the program. The program came up with 
additional testable hypotheses and was in a position to progress if 
these hypotheses were corroborated.
Despite the potential inconsistency, Keynesian theory by its very 
formulation lends itself quite readily to an investigation of the in­
flationary process. Firstly, it operates in easily understood terms of 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand, and by bringing price adjustment 
back into the picture, Keynesian theory can easily attribute inflation­
ary pressures to excess aggregate demand. Secondly, Keynesians often 
presume an exogenous money wage rate and what market forces do not 
determine— the wage rate— easily becomes a function of a variety of 
"non-economic" candidates. Hence the "cost-push" theories of inflation. 
As a result we find two kinds of Keynesian explanation of the inflation­
ary process. With the quantity theoriests, Keynesians shared the 
demand-pull explanation, albeit of a non-monetary type. In conflict 
with the quantity theorists, Keynesians had a cost-push explanation
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totally at odds with the idea that only market pressures pull prices up. 
The two explanations lead to diverging policy recommendations. The 
demand-pull variant called for a reduction in aggregate demand as a 
corrective; the cost-push variant called for a repression of the rele­
vant causal factors. The difference between the two however is not as 
wide as it seems. Both remedies are of a non-monetary nature. Besides, 
the two explanations are empirically indistinguishable: any opponent
of the cost-push explanation is bound to be open-minded enough about 
the matter of lags to attribute seemingly cost-push price movements at 
any point in time to demand pressures any length of time before.
The cost-push version was undoubtedly the worse of the anathema 
from the quantity theorists point of view. Any delving into spontane­
ous or exogenous (rather than market-pressure induced) change in prices 
or wages required explanations outside the boundaries of conventional 
economics. Referring to a term coined by Thorp and Quandt, Bronfen- 
brenner and Holtzman write that
the term "new inflation" embodies the opinion that the strength 
of economic pressure groups . . ., together with increased 
public concern with unemployment, had increased the likeli­
hood . . .  of "disequilibrium" price and wage increases being 
validated by expansive monetary and fiscal policies, resulting 
from organized pressure on monetary and fiscal authorities.15
This sounds like the starting point of a new sociological or political 
approach to inflation, but what follows in the same article is an 
apologetic review (reminiscent of heuristic d on page 66) of what cir­
cumstances would cause a cost-push deviation from the perfectly competi­
tive norm. The discussion deals with such issues as price inelasticity 
in the product market, and low factor-market elasticity of substitution, 
which would permit cost-push pressures to succeed. The major motivation
behind trade union pressure on wages is said to be not the cost-of- 
living increases or the profits earned by the employer, but rather 
"neighboring strategic wage rates," and then only- in the absence of 
perfect labor mobility.
A major development in the Keynesian treatment of inflation was
1the appearance in the protective belt of the Phillips curve, D which 
could be regarded as a Keynesian theory of inflation in its own right, 
with its own attendant hypotheses. The program again came up with new 
testable hypotheses. An alternative, somewhat cynical view would sug­
gest that the inability of Keynesian-oriented politicians to solve the 
problem of unemployment led theorists to propose a model indicating the 
necessity for some unemployment if inflation were to be kept in check.
By this view, refutation came in the form of policy-failure. Inability 
to solve the problem of unemployment led to a minor switch in policy. 
Loyalty to an overall Keynesian philosophy remained, but the full- 
employment objective now meant less than strictly full employment. In 
pseudo-Lakatosian terms, a minor change in policy accompanied a change 
in the protective belt, in the same way as a major, radical change in 
policy (such as occurred in the 1930’s and 1940's) perhaps accompanies 
a change in the hard-core itself, and therefore a switch in programs.
4. The next watershed in the Keynesian saga came with the episode 
of the shifting Phillips curves.^ When the simultaneous deterioration 
in inflation and unemployment conflicted with the Phillips hypothesis, 
the protective belt was repeatedly modified to appoint expectations, 
trade union power and so on as shift variables in the Phillips relation­
ship. The Phillips curve was able to explain everything after the 
event, but its predictive abilities were now inadequate. Ad hoc
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modifications helped to salvage temporarily the Phillips hypothesis, 
but, as a decompositional and specificational device which isolated the 
interaction of wage and price movements, it was refuted; the Keynesian 
program was again degenerating. Insofar as corroboration or refutation 
are at least partly a function of the events of the time, the environ­
ment of theorists and econometricians has a lot to do with the health 
of a program.
5. Degeneration in the program was evident in Tobin's presidential 
address to the American Economic Association in 1971.1® The message was 
"Ignore inflation and concentrate on the full-emplovment objective."
Here was an ill-fated attempt to revert to the specificational procedures 
of the 1940's, when it was politically safe to ignore inflation. The 
Keynesian program seems to be approaching another attempt at resuscita­
tion: Klein's address to the A.E.A. in 1978 called for more considera­
tion to be given to aggregate supply in macroeconomic stabilization
policy.19
Conclusion
The propositions of the neoclassical research program formulated by 
Latsis (and reproduced in Chapter 1 above, page 15) are designed for the 
generation of microeconomic models. In particular, the decision-makers 
of proposition (i) of the hard-core are obviously very well-informed 
microeconomic agents. As such, this proposition is not suitable for the 
generation of Keynesian models, where macroeconomic agents— or policy 
makers— are knowledgeable about the economic situation, but where micro- 
economic agents, to the extent they are included at all in such models, 
may not be. (Hence, for example, the neoclassical interpretation of
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microeconomic behavior in the conventional Phillips curve scenario sug 
gests that trade unionists are poor predictors of the future path of the 
price level.) Also, proposition (iv), asserting the self-regulating 
nature of the economy, is out of place in a Keynesian program, which 
highlights the need for macroeconomic intervention to stabilize the 
economy.
As I pointed out in the section entitled "Say’s Law" in this 
chapter, Keynesian theories compete, in a Lakatosian sense, with neo­
classical microeconomic theories. The positive heuristic of one is dif­
ferent from that of the other: the Keynesian theorist is directed to a
theoretical apparatus different from that of the neoclassical micro- 
economic economist. In addition, the nature of the recommendations 
differ. Keynesian theories,unlike their neoclassical microeconomic 
counterparts, generate short-term stabilization policy recommendations 
for macroeconomic policy-makers.
The next task was to suggest a hard-core and a positive heuristic 
for a Keynesian research program. The positive heuristic of the Keynes­
ian program instructs the economist to concentrate on aggregative rela­
tionships. The philosophy as well as the method of the program reflect 
the dethronement of the microeconomic approach and the accompanying 
belief in the workings of the market system. Keynesian macroeconomics 
is better suited for the study of stabilization policy and became neces­
sary with the growing stature of government in modern economies.
Chapter 1 discussed the situational determinism manifested in neo­
classical microeconomic theory. The typical microeconomic model is set 
up in such a way that the economic agents will automatically resort to 
the point of equilibrium. This type of arrangement was called
situational determinism, and is facilitated by the use of the substan­
tive, rather than the procedural form of rationality, and by the abstrac­
tion from sociological and other non-economic detail. Notice that in 
macroeconomics too, the abstraction from non-economic— particularly 
political and sociological— detail allows the economist to make policy 
recommendations, and if the policy-maker does not follow these recom­
mendations, he is often said to have made a mistake. The rationality 
presumed of the policy-maker is, again, of the substantive type and in 
these models, the policy-maker typically finds himself in a problem where 
the logic of situation dictates a unique solution. Occasionally the 
problem is more complex, as when, for example, the policy-maker faces 
the dilemma of the simple Phillips curve. Economics, however, has little 
to say in this situation about whether the policy-maker should opt for 
less inflation or less unemployment. But once that choice is made, 
probably on political grounds, the path to that end is clearly laid 
down by economic theory.
In the more straightforward situation, the macroeconomist typically 
recommends, say, a cut in government expenditures to the newly elected 
politician, whose pre-election promises might inhibit his ability to 
accept the economists’ recommendation. The situational logic of this 
theorist’s recommendation is of course valid within the boundaries of 
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A major development in economics since the War, aside from the 
Keynesian revolution, has been the later rise of monetarism. The pro­
fession has become a battleground between Keynesians and monetarists, 
with the latter appearing to gain the edge as inflation becomes a more 
pressing political issue, and in also line with the changing political 
mood. This chapter deals with monetarism and with a later development—  
the emergence of the rational expectations hypothesis, which is, at 
once, distinct from monetarism but in agreement with monetarism on 
major policy recommendations. This chapter will evaluate and compare 
these two components of the conservative wing of economics— to each of 
which is devoted a separate section. The third and final section 
attempts to fit each of the two schools into their respective research 
programs.
Monetarism
Below is a list of the distinguishing characteristics of monetar­
ism, at a theoretical, rather than policy implementation level. The 
purpose of this section is to link these characteristics with neo­
classical microeconomics and with Keynesianism.
1. The Inherent Stability of the Economic System. With its 
foundations in general equilibrium analysis, this characteristic is 
manifested in the monetarist assertion of a natural rate of unemployment,
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the stability of the demand function for money, the inclusion of perma­
nent (rather than measured or current) income in all demand functions, 
the exogeneity and the long-run neutrality of monetary aggregates (an 
assertion founded in the zero-homogeneity in the prices and income of 
the money-demand function), and the disavowal of policy activism of 
any sort.1
Their condemnation of all forms of policy interference with market 
processes leads monetarists to denounce the size of government spending 
in modern-day budgets. The expansion in the size of the government 
leads, in the eyes of many monetarists, to the crowding out of the 
private sector, through inflationary or non-inflationary means. Re­
course to the former route explains the persistence of inflationary 
problems, which arise primarily from the nexus of the growing size 
of government and the financing thereof through monetary expansion.
At the fore of the theoretical bridge-building between monetary and
fiscal expansion is the Brunner and Meltzer brand of fiscal monetar- 
2ism.
In the line with their belief in the intrinsic stability of market 
systems, monetarists downplay the contribution of external shocks to 
the rate of inflation. Accordingly, they exclude increases in the 
prices of raw materials, agricultural price fluctuations and the like, 
as sources of inflationary pressures. Such factors, they say, induce 
changes only in relative prices and resource allocation, but have no 
effect on the rate of inflation, unless they are accommodated by mone­
tary expansion.
2. The Separation of the Allocative from the Aggregative. In
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simpler terms, the microeconomics of resource allocation and relative 
prices are compatible with, but distinct from macroeconomics, which 
deals with aggregate levels of nominal variables, including the abso­
lute price level. The separation is reminiscent of, and indeed it is 
based upon the Quantity Theory and the superimposition of the equation 
of exchange upon a general equilibrium foundation. The dichotomy shows 
up in the reliance of most econometric monetarist literature on tests
of reduced-form equation systems which abstract from the sectoral and
3
allocative detail typical of Keynesian structural-equation systems.
(This particular point is discussed again at a later page.)
An inevitable consequence is the lack of emphasis by monetarists 
on sectoral contributions to the inflationary process and on the distri­
butional effects (among sectors and income groups) of monetary policy 
and its inflationary effects. From the monetarist viewpoint, a primary 
distributional consequence of inflation is the shift of resources from 
money holders to the issuers of money. This effect is studied in the 
context of a function relating the demand for money, in real terms, to 
its determinants. Agents in monetarist economics are considerably more 
rational, and have access to a far wider range of information than their 
Keynesian counterparts. The demand for real money balances depends 
partly upon the expected rate of inflation; this is because inflation 
reduces the real value of money balances and is therefore an important 
cost incurred by those who hold money. Expectations of future infla­
tion are in turn a function of the actual, current rate of inflation.
As a result, a rise in the rate of inflation, to the extent that it be­
comes internalized in expectations of future inflation, increases the 
cost of holding money, and therefore reduces the level of desired money
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holdings. Such desired holdings, however, are measured in real terms, 
and as a result monetarists point to a separate and conflicting effect: 
money holders will maintain a desired, real stock- by accumulating nomi­
nal balances at the same rate as the actual rate of inflation. The 
second of these effects constitutes a tax on money holders, the so- 
called inflation tax, the proceeds of which accrue to the issuers of 
money.^
3. Its Macroeconomic Nature, manifested by its emphasis on aggre­
gate variables and its use of the macroeconomic portfolio-balance 
method. This characteristic is not usually mentioned by monetarists in 
describing themselves, but it represents a major departure from the 
neo-Walrasian monetary theory discussed in Chapter 2, and so it is per­
tinent to our discussion. The first two characteristics link monetarism 
to its foundations; this characteristic asserts its primary purpose, 
namely the study of the macroeconomy and the short-run effects of policy. 
These three qualities sum up some major aspects of monetarism: like
Keynesian theory, it deals with short-run, macroeconomic policy evalua­
tion, but unlike Keynesian theory, it has deep microeconomic roots. 
Monetarism is founded upon the equation of exchange, carried over from 
the old Quantity Theory. Like the quantity theorists, monetarists be­
lieve in the exogeneity of the money supply.
There are however subtle differences between the old and the new, 
reflecting pre-Keynesian but especially Keynesian influences on the in­
terpretation of equation of exchange. The old Quantity Theory stressed 
the long-run neutrality of money and by the same token restricted the 
scope of its analysis to the influence of monetary changes on the long- 
run determination of the price level: in the long-run monetary changes
80
leave relative prices and all other "real" variables unchanged. The 
modern variant, enunciated by the monetarists, represents a significant 
compromise with the Keynesian concern with the short-run and concen­
trates on questions dealing with short-run disequilibria. Monetarists 
acknowledge the short-run non-neutrality of money, and search for the 
conditions which would ensure the short-run neutrality of policy. Some 
writers deny that short-run, disequilibrium periods were previously 
ignored in economics; Blaug,^ for example, points to the writings of 
Fisher and Marshall as places where short-run issues were indeed 
studied. Yet the strong emphasis on disequilibria typical of modern 
macroeconomics emerged with Wicksell, came to a head with Keynesianism, 
and is also contained in monetarism, which is in large part the analy­
sis of the effects of monetary changes in the short run on both prices 
and employment, in other words on both nominal as well as real vari­
ables.
With these first three characteristics in mind, a comment is now 
in order about the unity of monetarist thought. There is disagreement 
in the literature about this point, namely the question of how far one 
can deviate from mainstream monetarism and still retain one's monetar­
ist credentials. Take, for example, the use of small, reduced-form
models by monetarists. Milton Friedman pointed out, in private cor-
£
respondence with Mayer, that the disputes between large and small 
models are "almost entirely independent of the monetarist versus Keynes­
ian points of view." Mayer disagrees, and lists various reasons why small 
models are intrinsic to the monetarist model. One important reason is, 
of course, the monetarist emphasis on the aggregative and their de­
emphasis of the allocative and, therefore, the sectoral. Also their
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belief in the inherent stability of the private sector permits monetar­
ists to ignore the role of the private sector, and parts thereof, as 
sources of instability.
Elsewhere, however, Mayer misses various other aspects of monetar­
ist unity. For example, while recognizing that the monetarist's aggre­
gative, non-sectoral approach to the determination of the absolute price 
level is consistent with the monetarist principles, he remarks neverthe­
less that the monetarist "rejection of all cosh-push phenomena may well 
be unwarranted even within the monetarist framework." Suppose, he 
writes, that one industry increases its total receipts by pushing its 
prices upward, and then suppose that with a constant money supply (and 
therefore constant total expenditures), other industries react to 
shrinking demand by reducing production rather than by cutting prices. 
The result would be an inflation without monetary expansion— a result, 
says Mayer, which is entirely compatible with monetarist premises.
Maybe, but monetarists are unlikely to argue along Mayer's lines. They 
believe in a stable private sector, a stability based on a general 
equilibrium model which presumes adequate forces of competition across 
the economy. Such a presumption would preclude the first industry from 
getting away with its price heist and would discourage the quantity (as 
against price) adjustment of other industries. There is, I believe, an 
undeniable unity among these first three characteristics of monetarism. 
Perhaps they can be summed up into a definition of monetarism as an 
aggregative or macroeconomic interpretation of neoclassical theory, 
concerned with short-term and policy-related issues. It is a policy­
maker's cookbcok, entirely compatible with neoclassical economics.
The next pages deal with the fourth characteristic of monetarism,
jfSprfw*"’
82
and the one from which it derives its name.
4. Despite their acknowledgement of the confluence of monetary or 
fiscal policy, monetarists believe that the former is more potent, in 
the sense that its effects are less ambiguous and more reliable. What 
is being discussed is not the long-term influence of monetary changes—  
what Stein^ calls the Long-Run Quantity Theory— but rather the short­
term potency of monetary changes. Stein distinguishes between Fried­
man’s argument to the effect that monetary changes are the primary cause 
of changes in nominal income over the long-stretch and the St. Louis 
thesis which stresses the short-term potency of money. It is the latter 
variant which is being discussed here. Related to this point is the 
monetarist assertion of the exogeneity of monetary aggregates.
The first three characteristics of monetarism can be related, in a 
straightforward fashion to antecedents in economic thought. This last 
one and the attendant issues of the transmission process, however, are 
more problematic, and are dealt with at some length in the following 
few sections.
The Potency of Monetary Policy
As suggested in point 2 of the previous section, a significant part
of the monetarist literature lacks detailed theoretical specification
and seeks validation for its generalizations directly from empirical 
support. For example, Friedman and Meiselman provide the generalities
of a transmission mechanism but they do not present a formal model. The
St. Louis model consists of testable reduced-form equations which are 
not derived from a larger set of structural equations. The absence of 
a detailed formal specification is not only consistent with, but is
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indeed a consequence of an additional aspect of the monetarist philos­
ophy (not mentioned above) which is reminiscent of the Austrian school 
discussed earlier: policy decisions influence the private economy
through a wide variety of very intricate channels, a variety which 
eludes simple formalization. The process of specification— in other 
words, the task of selecting the more important relationships between 
the variables included in a model— is avoided in what is perhaps a mone­
tarist reaction to Keynesian method. As suggested earlier, monetarists 
generally rely, in their empirical method, on the reduced-form procedure, 
which merely tests the dependence of aggregate quantities on various 
policy variables, but without starting from, and certainly without test­
ing, a structural array of equations. Friedman’s instrumentalism® is a 
supporting methodology: what matters is not the realism of the postu­
lates of the theory, nor the degree of structural detail in its formal 
models, but merely how accurately the theory predicts.
All this notwithstanding, two major monetarists— Brunner and 
Meltzer— have published a long string of articles, containing formal and 
intricate macroeconomic models. Their analysis is in terms of distinct 
periods. In one Brunner^ article, the shortest period sees portfolio 
reallocation and asset price adjustment after the issue of additional 
financial instruments, such as money or securities. The analysis is de­
voted exclusively to the response within the asset markets. For this 
first period, Brunner suggests that the wealth effects of increased asset 
supplies are small, and may therefore be ignored.-*-0 Next, the conse­
quences of the first period are fed into the government budget process 
and the process of financial stock-flow adjustment in an "intermediate 
period" is then studied. The final period introduces the limitations
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imposed by the real aspects of the economy; the contributions of fiscal 
arrangements to long-run equilibrium are also analyzed.
Tobin-^ believes that portfolio adjustment theory— in particular 
its assertion "that non-monetary events . . . will also affect the 
attractiveness of accumulating capital assets"— ought to convince mone­
tarists that they are wrong in attributing so much strength to monetary 
policy. But if one looks closely at the first of these three Brunner 
periods, one finds an important part of the monetarist explanation for 
the relative potency of monetary policy.
Wealth owners allocate their holdings over a range of assets, but 
in equilibrium the distribution must be consistent with the set of asset 
yields or prices. Policy changes may upset the portfolio balance and 
cause changes in asset prices, which would in turn prompt further changes 
in the real economy. A decrease in the credit-market interest rate reduce 
borrowing costs and has expansionary consequences, while a reduction in 
the price of claims on existing real capital is contractionary to the ex­
tent that such a reduction prompts substitution away from new real capital
While the portfolio-balance method is certainly not unique to mone­
tarists, the nature of the portfolio relationships assumed by Brunner 
and Meltzer is. They include three separate asset markets: those for
money, credit and physical capital. The credit market encompasses the 
demand for and supply of credit, or equivalently, the supply of and de­
mand for credit instruments, such as government securities. The market 
for physical capital consists of the. demand for, and supply of claims on 
already-existing real capital, namely equity capital. The inclusion of 
the credit market makes for added institutional realism. Open-market 
purchases of government securities by the central bank, for example, lead
85
not only to an excess supply on the money market, but simultaneously to 
an excess demand on the credit market.
Take an increase in the supply credit instruments, such as might 
follow from an increased fiscal deficit. Assume that the credit market 
interest rate, RS, is determined primarily on the credit market, and the 
yield on real capital, RK, is determined mainly in the money market. 
Thanks to Walras’ law (Chapter 2), we can ignore the real capital market. 
(As mentioned above, wealth effects can be ignored for the purposes of 
this short run.) The increased supply of securities on the credit market 
will raise RS, prompting a reduction of demand on the money market, and 
therefore a lower RK. The increase in RS has a contractionary effect; 
the decline in RK has an expansionary effect. Assuming away later feed­
back between the two markets one concludes that these conflicting results 
cast a doubt on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, since the net port­
folio effect of a debt-financed increase in government expenditures 
could be contractionary.
The consequences of monetary policy are as intricate. Take an ex­
pansion in money supply, and to avoid the complications of open market 
operations, assume that it is delivered by a helicopter drop. Again 
assume that RK is determined mainly on the money market, RS on the 
credit market. The increase in the money supply will reduce RK. The 
demand for securities will decline, bringing down RS. The reduction in 
both RK and RS has an expansionary effect. Note however that these 
results depend crucially on the nature of portfolio relations assumed. 
Take the opposite, extreme case, where RS is determined on the money 
market, while RK is determined on the credit market. The increase in 
money supply will reduce RS, and the consequent rise in demand for
86
securities will pull RK upwards. The latter effect is, of course, con­
tractionary. Monetary policy is no longer unambivalently expansionary.
Brunner and Meltzer presume strong substitutability between money 
and real capital, and weak substitutability between money and other 
financial assets— a presumption which contributes to their assertion of 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Alternative assumptions— particu­
larly the assumption of proximity of money and the credit markets— lead 
to very different results.
There is, of course, more to the monetarist argument than these 
substitutability assumptions. B. M. Friedman presents this straight­
forward overview, in the context of a discussion of the strength of 
fiscal policy.
In a general model including money, bonds, and capital, there 
is no justification for presuming a_ priori whether the port­
folio effect associated with bond-financed government deficits 
offsets or reinforces the familiar income effect of fiscal 
policy.
Whether this portfolio effect is positive or negative 
depends on a crucial but simple relative substitutability con­
dition: portfolio crowding out (or crowding in) results when
the ratio of the substitution coefficient between bonds and 
money to the substitution coefficient between bonds and capital 
is smaller (greater) than the ratio of the respective wealth 
coefficients of the demands for money and capital. If the two 
ratios are precisely equal, there is no portfolio effect, and 
the traditional IS-LM analysis is adequate to describe bond- 
financed government deficits.
If portfolio crowding out does occur, in general it can 
. . . offset more than all of the standard income effect of 
fiscal policy.12
The wealth coefficients refer to the partial derivatives of the demand 
for money and separately, the demand for capital, both with respect to 
wealth. One benefit from Friedman's synthesis is that it ties the port- 
folio-balance argument neatly to the more conventional IS-LM approach.
Since the primacy of monetary policy is a hallmark of monetarism,
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the next task is to assess the links between the portfolio relationships 
assumed by monetarists, on the one hand, and their microeconomic neo­
classical foundations— if any— on the other. But first, a look at the 
portfolio-balance method in general.
The Price of Capital
Crude Keynesian practice is to make the rate of investment a func­
tion of the interest rate. However, an authentic microeconomic approach
1 *3would denounce this as an ad hoc procedure. What really varies with 
the rate of interest is not the rate of investment, but rather the 
capital stock desired by the firm, and therefore in the aggregate by 
all firms. Correct economic calculation starts from a comparison of 
the cost to the firm (or the price) of an additional unit of capital 
with the change in total revenue which accrues to the firm if it 
acquires the additional unit of capital. The former is a stock vari­
able, but the latter is a flow, which stretches over time— over the life 
of the capital good. The increase in revenue has to be converted into 
a stock, to make possible a comparison with the increase in cost. Here, 
we do use the rate of interest but not directly in the determination of 
the rate of investment, but merely to translate the extra flow of ser­
vices into the stock-equivalent marginal benefit to the firm, and then 
use the latter to find the optimal capital stock. The transition from 
one such stock to the next is compatible with an infinity of possible 
rates of investment. Of the latter, the one which achieves flow equili­
brium will be that for which the supply price of capital equals the 
market price. Complete, stock-flow equilibrium is achieved with stock 
equilibrium on the demand side, flow equilibrium on the supply side.
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The latter would be taken care of, in a general equilibrium model, 
by the theory of the firm, and in this case, the firms involved would 
make up the capital-producing industry. Macroeconomic models such as 
Brunner and Meltzer's which, as mentioned above, separate the "aggrega­
tive” from the "allocative," stop short of any microeconomic modelling. 
But the inclusion of both the interest rate and the price of capital 
as the stations through which the transmission channels operate is a 
more correct procedure, from a neoclassical microeconomic standpoint, 
than if only the interest rate were considered.
The use of both the price of' capital and the interest rate as 
indicators of policy is not unique to monetarists. Such Keynesians as 
Tobin and B. M. Friedman use this procedure too. This is another ex­
ample of the tendency among many Keynesians to minimize, or to compen­
sate for their deviations from the neoclassical. At the same time, its 
use by monetarists reflects their tendency to follow the neoclassical 
tradition.
Our next task is to address the broader question: is there a neo­
classical precedent for the monetarist assertion of the short-term 
primacy of monetary policy?
Neoclassical Theory and the Short-Term Primacy of Monetary Policy
There is an ideological connection between the neoclassical micro- 
economic model and the potency attributed by monetarists to monetary 
policy. Neoclassical theory with its favorable treatment of market 
processes lends itself quite easily to the arguments of the political 
right. Activism in fiscal policy is not usually the province of right- 
wing conservatives, who tend to view its distributional non-neutrality
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less favorably than they would view the consequences of monetary policy. 
To the extent that the right wing react negatively to all Keynesian 
claims for fiscal policy, there is a superficial,- political link 
between the neoclassical school and monetarist view of monetary policy.
But what about a theoretical connection? On one count, there is 
an important theoretical link. In the neoclassical microeconomic 
model, monetary changes are exogenous. So also in the monetarist model. 
And one of the portfolio-substitutability assumptions of monetarism 
emerges automatically from the assumption of exogeneity. A close link 
between the money and credit markets would bring about a Radcliffean 
weakening of central bank control over the supply of monetary or money­
like aggregates. That kind of proximity between the two markets is 
excluded by monetarism.
Monetarism presumes instead a portfolio closeness between the 
money and real capital markets. But the assumption of a perfect capital 
market places the equity market squarely in the real sector.-^ Although 
equity holdings, like securities, are financial assets, sales and pur­
chases of equity are regarded in portfolio theory as tantamount to 
purchases and sales of the physical capital which the equity lays a 
claim to. Put differently, portfolio theory does not recognize any 
distinction between the ownership and management of firms and the real 
capital inside them. Therefore the assumption of portfolio proximity 
between money and equity is simply a restatement of the presumption 
of the strong influence of money on the real economy. Unlike the 
portfolio separation of the money and capital markets, this assumption 
is not rooted in neoclassicism. As will be emphasized below, neo­
classical microeconomic theory, while stressing the long-term quantity
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theory, said nothing about the short-term effects of monetary policy.
The short-term predictions of monetarism can have little to do with 
neoclassical microeconomic theory.
The manner in which the assertion of the exogeneity of money be­
comes translated into specific portfolio relationship in the monetarist 
model suggests the compatibility of monetarism with the neoclassical 
model. Can one go a step further and state that the relative potency 
or reliability of monetary policy is a necessary product of any macro- 
economic theory rooted in the neoclassical tradition, such as monetarism? 
In other words, is this characteristic of monetarism, like the first 
three characteristics, an essential result of the hard core and the 
positive heuristic of the parent program? Or is it merely compatible 
with them, and can it therefore be relegated to the protective belt?
The latter characterization is, I believe, the correct one.
It should be emphasized that the neoclassical microeconomic model 
is entirely a study of long-run comparative statics, while monetarism 
deals primarily in the short-run periods in between. It will be recall­
ed that the neo-Walrasian model in Chapter 2— or any other neoclassical 
general-equilibrium monetary model, for that matter— has nothing to say 
about what happens between one equilibrium and another. And it is this 
period which sees the macroeconomic transmission process unfold. The 
neoclassical microeconomic tradition has no bearing on any macroeconomic 
conclusions concerning the potency or reliability of monetary or fiscal 
policy in the inter period.
To summarize, the monetarist use of the portfolio balance approach 
follows the neoclassical tradition, particularly in its use of the 
price of capital as an additional indicator of policy and in its
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separation of the money from the credit markets. But the conclusions 
concerning the relative potency of monetary policy depend on more than 
these considerations. They also depend on short-term wealth effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy, the short-term income effects and additional 
short-term aspects of portfolio substitutability. About these, and about 
the short-term potency of monetary policy, neoclassical microeconomic 
theory has nothing to say.
The section entitled "New Research Programs" below, will suggest 
that a conservative macroeconomic program includes monetarism as a con­
stituent theory. The neoclassical bias and the macroeconomic orienta­
tions are crucial ingredients of the program, and they are therefore 
reflected in the program's hard core and positive heuristic. But the 
monetarist assertion of the short-term primacy of monetary policy is not, 
and is therefore relegated to the protective belt.
Crowding Out and Ultrarationalism
A more detailed look at the IS-LM model sheds further light on the 
relative strength and reliability of fiscal and monetary policy, and will 
also serve as a transition to our next topic— the rational expectations 
hypothesis. In the IS-LM setting, one can distinguish between three sep­
arate effects at work. Take a bond-financed increase in government expen 
diture. The first is the direct fiscal effect on aggregate demand, repre 
sented by an expansionary rightward shift in the IS. There there is the 
crowding out of private investment as the interest rate rises along the 
LM (following the shift in the IS). Thirdly, the increase in the public 
holdings of government securities prompts wealth-induced shifts in both 
the IS and the LM. The shift in the former is expansionary, that in the
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latter is contractionary. With all these conflicting effects, the net 
result is hard to determine on a priori grounds, especially if one’s 
objective is a comparison with the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Yet Blinder and Solow insist on an a_ priori solution, and set up
an IS-LM model, complete with wealth effects and a C. Christ-style
government-budget constraint. On the basis of their model, they con­
cede that judging by the first two effects, bond-financed fiscal policy 
is weaker than monetary policy. Income will rise by less, as will tax
receipts by government (at existing tax rates). And for that very
reason, and also because bond-financing commits the government to future 
interest payments, "the budgetary gap is harder to close. . . .  It 
therefore takes a greater rise in income to induce tax receipts suffici­
ent to close the budgetary gap." They conclude that "not only is 
deficit spending financed by bonds expansionary in the long-run, it is 
even more expansionary than the same spending financed by the creation 
of new money."15
Unfortunately, their definition of the long-run— merely requiring 
that the government's budget be balanced— is likely to leave monetarists 
unconvinced of Blinder and Solow's conclusions. Had the "long-run" 
incorporated notions of taxpayer rationality and of the economy's auto­
matic tendency toward full-employment or a "natural" rate of unemploy­
ment, the conclusions would have been very different, and more akin to 
those reached by the Ultrarationalists. ^  The latter hold that the 
private sector is automatically crowded out by an increase in govern­
ment expenditure, regardless of how it is financed. The private sector 
correctly anticipates future tax liabilities which inevitably will 
result from increased government borrowing. As a result of this
extraordinary degree of rationality on the part of taxpayers, fiscal 
policy leaves aggregate income unchanged. Ultrarationalism is to active 
fiscal policy what the rational expectations hypothesis is to active 
monetary policy.
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis
The concept of money illusion helps us to understand, from a neo­
classical point of view, a major Keynesian departure from neoclassicism. 
It refers to the tendency of economic agents to calculate in nominal 
rather than in real terms— to measure their income, for example, in 
monetary terms rather than in terms of the claims it represents over 
physical products. The term "money illusion" implies that the use of 
money clouds the perception, as it were, and hampers the ability of the 
economic agent to measure variables accurately. Expansionary monetary 
policy, for example, would raise prices, but the money illusion would 
keep employees from asking for a higher wage. Whether economic agents, 
if they had the requisite information, would reason in real terms is 
beside the point. To a neoclassicist, the crucial point is that their 
behavior is irrational: neoclassical theory uses the substantive form
of rationality and that assumes the transmission of adequate informa­
tion.
The postulate of zero homogeneity of real variables in prices and 
income, and therefore the equation of exchange and the principle of the 
neutrality of money, went out the window with Keynesian economics. It 
could not longer be argued that an increase in the stock of money leads 
to a proportionately equivalent increase in all prices. Rather, expan­
sionary policy could change relative prices (thanks partly to money
illusion) and therefore employment and output. However we observe in 
the literature various attempts at salvaging the homogeneity postulate 
and reconciling the Keynesian to the neoclassical. For example, some 
would maintain that the homogeneity postulate applied to all variables 
measured at their actual levels, but that some aspects of behavior were 
dependent upon expected levels. In other words, a basic premise of neo- 
classicism was compromised in order to gain acceptability by Keynesians. 
Some of the more eloquent attempts at the Keynesian-neoclassical recon­
ciliation can be found in the literature of Phelps and company.^ An 
example is Clower's explanation of the Phillips’ relationship between 
inflation and unemployment, an explanation also used to reconcile the 
monetarist vertical version of the Phillips curve to the conventional, 
downward-sloping Keynesian interpretation. The explanation revolves 
around a disparity between employers and employees with respect to the 
speed at which they adjust their expectations about the rate of price 
inflation. Employees' expectations change more slowly, and as a result 
their wage-demand lags behind the real wage as correctly (or, at least 
more correctly) perceived by the better-informed employers. The conse­
quent increase in employment appears to be at best a short-run remedy, 
but then the Keynesian configuration never asked for more. The Keynes­
ian objective is to try to stabilize cyclical fluctuations, and after 
all, cycles are short-run phenomena.
The point being made here is that much of the theoretical adjust­
ment to neoclassical theory was in the presumptions about psychology of 
behavior. The major development in this context was the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis. According to the latter, expectations adjust 
gradually to actual values, with the change during period t in the
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expected level of a variable being a constant function of the differ­
ence, in period t (or, alternatively, t-1) between the actual and the 
expected value of the variable.
In contrast, there is the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), 
which totally obliterates the potential for activist policy. The REH 
predicates that expectations are formed in exactly the same way as the 
theory makes its predictions. The appellation "rational" is widely 
accepted among economists, and the task of this section is to interpret 
the meaning of the term and to relate it to our earlier concept of 
substantive rationality (Chapter 1). It will be argued below that the 
REH ignores the complicated procedure in which mass psychology forms its 
expectations and replaces it with the presumption that theoretical pre­
dictions and mass expectations are one and the same. This is not to 
imply that merely because it uses the procedural type of rationality 
(also in Chapter 1), the adaptive expectations hypothesis is necessarily 
correct. However, by its very ad hoc nature, it at least recognizes the 
complicated nature of the matter and makes a weak attempt at an approxi­
mation.
To elaborate on the REH, consider this simple model put forward by 
Muth,^ who was inspired by the observation that "the average of expec­
tations in an industry is more accurate than naive models and as 
accurate as elaborate equation systems." Let C stand for consumption 
and Y for production; let p represent prices, pe expected prices, all 
measured as deviations from their respective equilibrium levels. Then 
suppose consumption is a function of current prices, while production 
is determined by expected prices:
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C = -ap 
t t
Y = bpe + u
Y = C 
t t
The term u stands for the error term. From the above, it follows that
b e  1 
V  “ aP t" a Ut
With Eu^ = 0 and no serial correlation, the price level predicted by the
theory is
„  b eEp =  p
*t a t
where, again, pe represents the price level expected by economic agents.
Muth adds that, "Information is scarce and the economic system 
generally does not waste it"; it follows that, "if the prediction of 
the theory is substantially more accurate than the expectations of the 
firm, . . . there would be opportunities for the 'insider' to profit 
from the knowledge," until the "aggregate expectation of the firms is
Ofl n
the same as the prediction of the t h e o r y . I n  other words, Ept = p^,
which (assuming b/a ^ -1) will be true only if pe = 0. This means that
t
the price expected by the public will be the equilibrium price. This 
procedure drastically simplifies the problem at hand. Were it not for 
the assumption of rationality, Ep^ = pe , and the consequent p® = Ep^ = 
0, the theorist would face the task of figuring out how expectations 
are formed: Ep (the price predicted by the theory) would depend on the
manner in which pe (the price expected by the public) is generated.
With a serially correlated error term, Muth shows that the price ex­
pected by the public becomes a geometrically weighted moving average of 
previous prices:
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and "the 'coefficient of adjustment' in the expectations formula 
[depends] on the demand and supply coefficients."^ This scenario is
not possible under the REH, since persistent error as manifested in a 
serially correlation error term is certainly at odds with rational
The implications of this type of model for macroeconomic theory 
are very serious. For an active policy to be effective, expected prices 
must lag behind policy-manipulated, actual prices. This means that the 
authorities must aim at and achieve a growth rate in prices which out­
strips expectations. If the expectations of economic agents are 
rational (in the REH sense), actual and expected prices would be identi­
cal, and policy would therefore be fruitless.
Originally proposed by Muth in 1961, the rational expectations
appeared under a new name in 1970: Burmeister and Dobell called them
23myopic expectations, but the new name never caught on. And in a 
sense, rational expectations are myopic. To see this, take adaptive 
expectations once again. Here the expected value of a variable is 
formed on the basis of present and past values of the variable, accord­
ing to some system of weighting. As the weight attached to the present 
period increases, expectations become closer and closer to the rational 
in that at the limit, when the current actual value has a weight of one 
(and therefore the formation of expectations is myopic), expected and 
actual values are identical. Expectations adjust instantaneously and 
smoothly to reality so that the actual, expected and predicted levels 
of a variable become one and the same.
22expectations.
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Yet-the simplicity of this logic hides a potential flaw. A lay­
man would point out that various theorists, each holding to a different 
theory about how the economy works, could all use the rational expecta­
tions hypothesis in their models. Expectations would then be formed 
in a different manner in each one of them, and yet they would all be 
"rational." This argument would be trivial were it not for an under­
lying problem which it reflects. The REH distinguishes between the 
predicted level of a variable and its expected level, whereas there 
are really three: the actual level, the level predicted by the theory
and the level expected by economic agents other than the theorists.
The REH assumes that the expected level equals the predicted level of 
the true theory. Misspecification is assumed to be randomly distri­
buted around the true theory. Two conditions need to be met for such 
a perfect market in information to emerge: (1) From among the theories
tested by economists, the "best" one will emerge and become accepted 
throughout the economy. (2) Since the actual and the predicted values 
must be the same, the "best" theory must also be the perfect theory.
This requires that the available information must be adequate for the
"best" theory to be the "correct" one too.
24Benjamin Friedman writes that there are essentially two "infor­
mation requirements." The first is the information exploitation assump­
tion, which asserts that "people will exploit information until the 
point at which its marginal product equals its (perhaps zero) marginal 
cost." The second is the information availability assumption, which 
requires that "people not observe or know in advance the value of cer­
tain economic variables, but also draw, on the basis of these known 
values, inferences which are identical to the inferences of the process
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actually generating the outcomes in question." This second assumption 
boils down to the following two statements, (1) economic agents have 
access to the relevant data, and (2) economic agents either have the 
correct economic model or they generate predictions as if they had the 
correct model.
It is now time to return to the distinction made earlier (back in 
Chapter 1) between procedural and substantive rationality. The complex 
problems faced by econometricians in their day-to-day work are an 
example of the procedurally rational technique, where the objective is 
to devise and implement a way in which (or a procedure by which) to 
achieve some objective, in this instance that of generating accurate 
predictions. Likewise, the person who is about to make an economic 
decision might have to make up his mind as to which of the currently 
available forecasts to use. The REH, on the other hand, uses the sub­
stantive type of rationality. In our earlier terminology, the problem 
is set up in a single-exit fashion, where economic activity in the for­
mation-marketing system ensures that the economic agent has a choice 
between the perfect and correct forecast and all the incorrect ones, 
and the decision is, very predictably, to choose the former.
In the latter situation, any form of policy is doomed to failure. 
For example, as mentioned above, monetary policy could be effective only 
as long as it is able to open a gap between actual and predicted values. 
It turns out, however, that an implication of the rational expectations 
hypothesis is that even in the short-run, any deviation between actual 
and expected values will consist purely of the so-called white noise.
In other words, any such deviation is totally independent of policy.
As a result, active policy is impotent, even in the short-run.^
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This brings us back to the axiomatic, neoclassical world above, 
where there was no short run and there was no room for policy in what 
was an entirely microeconomic world. The macroeconomic short-term 
policy niche which has been of concern to economists particularly since 
Keynes does not exist.
Some economists have attempted to find room within this sort of
9  fitheory for an effective short-term policy. In one such attempt, it 
has been noted that in econometrics, the estimate of a parameter will 
approach its true value but only as the sample size increases. Econo­
metricians often use the rolling-sample technique, where older data are 
discarded as newer data becomes available. The justification for this 
procedure is that the specification of any model is only an approxima­
tion of the true economic structure and that such an approximation 
becomes less and less valid as the time frame expands with the sample 
size. The consequent need to limit the time-span implies that the 
econometrician might never achieve a sample size large enough for the 
estimate to ever "reach" the true value. There is a need to limit the 
sample size, and yet there is also a need to have a large enough sample 
size. It follows that the perfect model, and therefore truly rational- 
agent expectations are unattainable; this is then used to justify a 
hybrid form of adaptive expectations which would allow for a short-run 
effectiveness of policy. ^
What makes all this particularly relevant for our purposes is the 
apparent contradiction between substantive rationality and macroeconomic 
theory. The relevance of macroeconomics is achieved only as the theory 
moves from the substantively to the procedurally rational, away from 
perfect rationality and the rational expectations hypothesis, a
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transition which appears to run parallel to the move from the micro- 
economic to the macroeconomic.
Monetarism and the REH
Monetarism has traditionally presumed that expectations take a 
while to catch up with the economic consequences of a change in policy. 
Hence the presumed initial impact of monetary expansion on real vari­
ables, such as output, and only later on the price level. The reason 
for this is that in the aftermath of an expansionary policy spurt, 
agents may expect an unchanged inflation rate and therefore the public 
reacts by increasing real output. However, since the unemployment rate 
cannot be reduced below its natural rate, this real expansion is short­
lived. But this interregnum where the policy-makers get away with a 
reduction in unemployment, while recognized by monetarists, is not com­
patible with the REH, where the expected price level does not wait 
before catching up with the actual price level.
But how significant is this difference between monetarism and the 
REH? Monetarists generally recognize the short-term potency of policy, 
but still do not recommend the use of activist, interventionist, policy 
for short-term or any purpose. Because of the indeterminacy of time 
lags and the fuzziness of the transmission mechanism, activism will not 
attenuate but instead will worsen the ups and downs of the business 
cycle. In the short-term, unemployment may be reduced, but the overall 
destabilization might end up worsening the underlying, natural rate of 
unemployment. To that extent, policy intervention is not futile but 
indeed harmful. On this count, then, I would conclude that there is no 
operational difference between monetarism and the REH.
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But, on another count, a significant difference appears. Monetar­
ism, despite its microeconomic foundations, is a macroeconomic science. 
In a sense, as Mayer argues, it is more aggregative than Keynesianism.
On the other hand, the REH is minimally macroeconomic. If adherents of 
the REH had their way, macroeconomics as we know it would disappear. 
Given the confrontation with the Keynesians, macroeconomic equipment is 
de rigueur. But it should come as no surprise that literature emanating 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis makes a stir for a return 
to the general equilibrium model. Wallace lashes out at both monetarist 
and Keynesian econometric models, accusing both of being partial-equili- 
brium models, little more than a hodgepodge of correlations, with the 
ad hoc theorizing lacking the proper theoretic-behavioral foundations. 
This allegedly shows up in economic agents persistently committing the 
same mistakes, as in the formation of expectations in the adaptive- 
expectations formulation in such models.
. . . [It] could be the case that the structure during the 
sample period (including government policy) was such that the 
best forecast of the future price level is the current price 
level— often called static expectations. But such a scheme 
would not be best if for whatever reason, possibly a different 
government policy, the price level turns out to increase as, 
say, 7% per year. A model that implicitly assumes that people 
forecast as if the price level takes a random walk around a 
zero trend when, in fact, it has a nonzero trend is a disequili­
brium model. ^
What the REH does, of course, is to apply the equilibrium concept to the 
generation of expectations. With regard to the problems in macroecono­
metric models, Wallace advises against tinkering with the available 
models, and recommends a wholesale switch to "microeconomic general 
equilibrium theorizing and modeling."
One can easily foresee the upcoming swing in academic economics
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back toward substantial microeconomic detail. tJhat will perhaps dis­
tinguish these future models is the recognition that analysis of policy 
calls for an emphasis on the stochastic dimension of the relevant prob­
lems .
In sum, then, the natural tendency for a discussion of monetarism 
to extend into the REH follows for a variety of reasons. The REH may 
be interpreted as a restatement of various aspects of monetarism, but 
in stronger terms. There is in both the same denunciation of policy 
activism, the same allegiance to the equation of exchange. Politically 
and ideologically they are stablemates.. But the role of microeconomics 
is far greater in the REH. Monetarism was a shot in the arm for macro­
economics, particularly after the Keynesians ran into difficulties.
The macroeconomic tradition may be in trouble if REH spreads around.
New Research Programs
It is now time to fit monetarism and the REH into their appropriate 
research programs. The macroeconomic character of monetarism suggests 
that the neoclassical microeconomic program of Chapter 1 cannot contain 
monetarism as a constituent theory. But that same program contains no 
propositions which are inconsistent with the REH, which can therefore 
be regarded as one of the theories generated by the positive heuristic 
of that program.
Monetarism, like Keynesianism, fails the first postulate of the 
Latsis' neoclassical microeconomic program on page 15. Economic agents 
cannot be presumed to be omniscient in a monetarist model, unless these 
agents are understood to be macroeconomic agents, or policy-makers.
(This is, in fact, where monetarism differs from the REH.) It has to
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be stressed that the microeconomic agent of Latsis’ neoclassical research 
program is a different character from the agent of monetarism, who is 
primarily the macroeconomic policy-maker.
The research program whose constituent theories include monetarism 
is also not the Keynesian one of Chapter 3 (page 66). In particular, the 
policy suggestions of one program differ significantly from those of the 
other: they are truly competing programs. The monetarist program acknow­
ledges the well-functioning nature of market processes: the Keynesian
program does not and the absence of such an acknowledgement is evident in 
the hard core and positive heuristic of the Keynesian program and needs 
to be rectified in the construction of a rival program. So a conservative 
macroeconomic research program is suggested below, from which monetarism 
is spun off as one member theory. This new program retains from Latsis' 
neoclassical microeconomic program the emphasis on the stability and 
well-functioning nature of the market mechanism. But it does compete with 
the same program in that it uses a different, macroeconomic, theoretical 
equipment. It borrows this apparatus from the Keynesian program, but it 
differs from the latter in its regard for the market system, and it com­
petes with it in its policy recommendations. It cannot be called a mone­
tarism program, because it could possibly generate more than just mone­
tarist theories. Instead, its label as a conservative macroeconomic pro­
gram comes from its two major qualities which set it apart from competing 
programs.
Its hard-core reads:
(i) The market economy is inherently stable and self-regulating, 
while its positive heuristic goes as follows:
(a) Construct macroeconomic models, equipped to analyze 
macroeconomic policy issues, including those relating
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to the interequilibrium period.
(b) These models will be as compatible as possible with 
the microeconomic theory of general equilibrium.
As suggested above, monetarist predictions concerning the potency 
and reliability of monetary policy (usually made in the context of a 
comparison with fiscal policy) are not necessary products of the hard­
core and the positive heuristic just predicted. Hence those particular 
predictions, while crucial to monetarism, belong only in the protective 
belt of the program. This particular point is discussed further in 
Chapter 5.
In contrast, the REH is not incompatible with any of the proposi­
tions in the hard-core of the neoclassical microeconomic program, and it 
meets every instruction of the positive heuristic of that program. The 
decision-makers referred to in propositions (i), (ii) and (iii) of the 
hard core can now be interpreted as being either microeconomic or macro- 
economic. All that is required is that the term "decision-makers" be 
less rigidly interpreted than in Chapter 1. The substantive rationality 
with which microeconomic agents are endowed in the neoclassical program, 
and the ensuing situational determinism, come out intact in REE: pro­
positions (b) and (c) of the positive heuristic of the neoclassical 
program, like all the other components of that program, are fully honored 
by the REH. It is, of course, true that the REH is generally discussed 
in the context of the debate about macroeconomic policy but this does not 
make it a macroeconomic theory. For one thing, the logical implication 
of the REH is that there is no interequilibrium period, no short run: 
this automatically disqualifies the REH as a macroeconomic theory, in 
the conventional interpretation of the word. The REH has, of course, a
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major macroeconomic implication in the sense that it leaves no scope 
whatsoever for activist macroeconomic policy. But its use in macro- 
economic models is not different from any other use of the implications 
of the neoclassical general-equilibrium theory in a macroeconomic dis­
cussion. The REH is essentially a rewriting of the Walrasian general- 
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In economics, theory is tested not merely by its predictive ability 
(broadly speaking, the type of testing shared with the natural sciences), 
but also in the course of time by the degree of political success earned 
by the policies inspired by the theory. From that follows the procedure 
of distinguishing between theories not only on the basis of the nature 
of their theoretical method (for example, whether they are macroeconomic 
or microeconomic), but also by the political flavor of their policy 
recommendations.
No theory can be all-inclusive: comprehensiveness is cut down as
the theorist selects, on a priori grounds, the more important variables, 
and between these the more vital relationships. Keynesian theory 
operates primarily at the macroeconomic level, while the more ideologi­
cally conservative theories tei.d towards the microeconomic end of the 
spectrum, and automatically make stronger assumptions about the ration­
ality of economic agents. The degree of detachment from the macro- 
economic as well as the severity of the psychological assumptions 
increase as the theory veers away from the study and formulation of 
short-term activist policy.
Monetarism has very few good words for macroeconomic activism.
Still, its tools of analysis are principally macroeconomic and one of 
its major concerns is the role of monetary processes in the periods
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between equilibria— a period where microtheory leaves a void— and its 
assumptions about microeconomic rationality are much less rigid than 
those of neoclassical microeconomic theory. For these reasons, Chapter 
4 made monetarism a member of a conservative macroeconomic program.
The rational expectations hypothesis, on the other hand, leaves 
no room whatsoever for policy activism, and in line with the pure 
theory of comparative statics has no short run. Like the ultraration­
alist school in fiscal theory, the REH has dramatic implications for 
macroeconomics: to wit, macroeconomic policy is totally futile. It
does not breach any of the propositions of Latsis' neoclassical pro­
gram, and it was identified in Chapter 4 as a member of that program. 
Like microeconomic general-equilibrium theory, it manifests situational 
determinism at the level of the microeconomic agent: the substantive
form of rationality is used in the generation of expectations accord­
ing to the rules of the REH. The hypothesis itself generates some 
macroeconomic implications of the general equilibrium model, and what 
makes these macroeconomic conclusions stand out is the situational 
determinism at the microeconomic level, a determinism brought about 
by stringent assumptions about the psychology of microeconomic agents.
If one defines macroeconomics simply as the study of aggregate 
variables, the REH can be considered macroeconomic. If however one 
uses a neoclassically-oriented definition of macroeconomics— as the 
study of the macroeconomic-policy determination of macroeconomic vari­
ables in the disequilibrium, short-run period— then the REH is not 
macroeconomic. In particular, it shows no concern with the short-run, 
which can be regarded from the neoclassical point of view as a province
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of macroeconomics. Admittedly, it does concern itself with macro­
policy, to the point of saying that macropolicy is entirely futile.
But using Lakatosian terminology, one can suggest' that the future of 
the REH, to the extent it stays at the forefront of a progressive neo­
classical research program, lies in the elaboration of microeconomic, 
general equilibrium models.
This almost brings us back, full circle, to the neoclassical mone­
tary model of Chapter 2, except that the latter not only stressed the 
futility of activist policy (as does the REH), but went a step further 
and asserted the irrelevance of all policy.
Situational determinism pervades mainstream economic theory. At 
the microeconomic level, the adoption of the substantive form of ration­
ality leads to the single-exit solutions of microeconomics. From the 
neoclassical point of view, Keynesian macroeconomics makes much weaker 
assumptions about rationality. But even so, Keynesianism along with 
monetarism show a situational determinism at the macroeconomic, policy­
maker’s level. The problem is usually set up in such a way that the 
theory generates a clear-cut economic solution and the policy-maker 
implicitly faces a clear choice between the optimal policy and the wrong 
policy. The solution is strictly an economic one, and the theory ab­
stracts away from all non-economic factors (such as political or social 
considerations) which might impinge on the policy-maker's freedom of 
choice and make the economically optimal solution no longer such an 
obvious choice.
Microeconomic situational determinism as used by Latsis defines 
the boundary between economics and psychology. The extension of the 
concept to macroeconomics throws the emphasis on the boundary separating
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economics from the social sciences. On this boundary, a further comment 
is perhaps in order. Students are repeatedly reminded during their 
economics education of the vital distinction between positive or scien­
tific economics, and untestable, value-laded normative economics. Yet 
during their careers most economists repeatedly make normative or pre­
scriptive statements, of the type, "The federal government should . . ." 
or "The Federal Reserve must . . .," or, "the President is making a mis­
take in. . . . "  Many of these recommendations are directed at political 
agents. Very often, these same agents interact through the political 
process (rather than through an economic or a market process, in the 
narrow sense), even though the outcomes of these processes are of an 
economic nature. But economists persist in drawing a line of demarca­
tion between themselves and political scientists. It is of course true 
that a model which attempts to cover everything in social science is 
bound to be overburdened and worthless (in terms of its predictive 
ability), but perhaps the boundaries of macroeconomics are drawn some­
what too rigidly.
On the Lakatosian method, the reader will recall that this requires 
a precise definition of the program in the form of a set of hard core 
propositions and a set of instructions on how to construct theories 
within the program. This permits an accurate classification of theories 
by program with all the benefits that such precision entails. Member­
ship in the monetarist program, for example, requires more than the 
prescription by the theory of a monetary rule. In linking monetarism 
to its precedents, Chapter k emphasized the compatibility of monetarism 
with neoclassical microeconomics— hence the right-wing ideological 
basis of monetarism. But Aschheim and Tavlas^ deny that monetarism is
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the "exclusive domain of conservatism," and support their argument by 
citing such writers in the Chicago tradition as Paul Douglas, whose 
writings show a "simultaneous allegiance to the quantity theory and to 
left-wing i d eology.However,  by the criteria of the conservative 
macroeconomic research program formulated in Chapter 4, Paul Douglas 
was not right-wing enough to qualify as a monetarist, his recommendation 
of a monetary rule notwithstanding.
Stein writes, "conceivably (the monetarist) could be a Socialist 
but not a Marxist, because a monetarist believes that . . . the price 
system is an efficient allocation of resources."3 But since when do 
Socialists acknowledge the well-functioning of free markets? Obviously, 
there are brands of socialism which insist on monetary stringency and 
prudence, but that does not automatically entitle them to the label of 
monetarists. In Solow's^ lexicon, they perhaps fall under the category 
of "little monetarists," whereas in this dissertation, monetarism is 
described by its mainstream and logically-entailed features— what Solow
belittles as the "syndrome" of "Great Monetarism.”
The research-program methodology may also be useful as a predictive 
tool. It suggests that the propositions which are placed in the hard­
core will be preserved as long as the program lives. In contrast, pro­
positions in the protective belt are easily shed when they fail the
test of empirical corroboration. Hence the value of the distinction 
between the essential characteristics of the conservative macroeconomic 
program and the propositions in its protective belt. Unlike the former, 
the latter are not essential to the survival of the program and may 
become modified, or even jettisoned, over time as the evidence dictates. 
Chapter 4 suggested that monetarism consists of a set of theories which
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are members of a macroeconomic conservative research program, whose hard 
core and positive heuristic emphasize the macroeconomic nature of the 
analysis as well as its microeconomics theoretical underpinnings. I 
also suggested that the primacy afforded to monetary policy, while a 
major characteristic of monetarism, is not crucial to the program as a 
whole. Even though it is a primary characteristic of monetarism, the 
assertion of the potency and reliability of monetary policy (relative 
to fiscal policy) belongs in the protective belt of the program. The 
implication is that should the prediction of the primacy of monetary 
policy run into empirical difficulties, the conservative program may 
still survive, without that prediction, and perhaps without monetarism 
at its forefront. The conservative right would still have a macro- 
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